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ABSTRACT 
ZUMRAT K. SALMORBEKOVA: PROMOTION OF GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS 
THROUGH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS: US/NATO 
INTERVENTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN 1999 AND RUSSIAN INCURSION 
INTO GEORGIA IN 2008 
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Jenkins) 
 
The August 2008 Russian use of force against sovereign Georgia shocked the 
international community.  The intervention triggered comparisons with the US-led NATO 
military intervention into the former Yugoslavia in 1999.  This paper explores key foreign 
policy interests of the US and Russia and examines how these interests were expressed in 
these military interventions.  The analysis revealed similarities in goals and differences in 
approaches.  Both the US and Russia promoted their national geopolitical interests through 
military intervention.  Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in their peace-
mediation approaches with the involvement of international institutions preceding military 
intervention.  The author believes that Russia’s incursion into Georgia sends a strong 
message to newly independent states, in particular Ukraine, about the possible consequences 
of seeking close relations with the West.  Indeed, the building of mutual trust and 
understanding between the United States and Russia provides the best hope for overcoming 
future aggressive actions in response to other regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The five day war in the South Caucasus between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 
shocked the international community and raised many questions regarding the ability of 
international institutions to prevent unlawful military interventions into the territory of 
sovereign states, as well as their ability to respond to such regional conflicts.  The Russian 
military intervention into the territory of Georgia provoked widespread discussion about the 
legitimacy of the use of force against a sovereign state and, as a consequence, raised 
questions about its impact on stability in Europe, threats to the energy corridor, which goes 
through Georgian territory, and the real role of Russia as an equal partner to democratic 
countries in ensuring peace and security in the region.1  
In academic circles and the mass media, this event triggered discussions that the US-
led NATO war over Kosovo created precedents for opportunistic adaptations.  George 
Friedman argues that “the war in 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008” and 
points out that without understanding Kosovo it is impossible to understand the war between 
Russia and Georgia. 2  On the contrary, Charles King argues that South Ossetia and Kosovo 
                                                          
1
 “Russia vs. Georgia: The Fallout.” International Crisis Group. Europe Report no 195, Tbilisi/Brussels. 22 
Aug. 2008. 15 Oct. 2008.  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/195_russia_vs_georgia___the_fallout.pdf>. 
2
 Friedman, George. “Georgia and Kosovo: A Single intertwined Crisis.” Stratfor.com, 25 Aug. 2008.  17 Oct. 
2008 <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/georgia_and_kosovo_single_intertwined_crisis>. 
George Friedman is Founder and CEO of Stratfor, a private intelligence company publishing geopolitical and 
security analysis.  He is author of America’s Secret War. His new book, The Next Hundred Years, will be 
published in January 2009. 
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are not the same; he indicates that there are differences in the circumstances of the military 
interventions, as well as in the involvement of multilateral institutions before and during the 
operation, which in Kosovo was undertaken by a Western coalition and afterwards followed 
by a UN peacekeeping mission.3  
Ironically, the Russian leadership used the same terminology as did the US and 
NATO during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 in justifying its use of force against Georgia, such as 
“genocide,” “peacekeeping,” “humanitarian intervention,” “coercion to peace,” “pre-
emptive-strike,” and others.  In addition, the Kremlin used the Kosovo case to legitimize its 
own actions, pointing out that Kosovo is a ‘precedent,’ arguing that the people of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia equally have the right to decide their own future.  Russia staunchly 
opposed NATO’s military intervention, calling it a violation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Serbia and accusing the US of using double standards in international affairs.  In 
August 2008, Russia itself was highly criticized and condemned for undermining Georgian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  A sequence of events in the post-Soviet space, such as 
the gas scandal with Ukraine, the strengthening of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization in the CIS, and the decision of the government of Kyrgyzstan to close the US 
air base, has demonstrated the need for a deeper understanding of Russian foreign policy and 
US national interests in the post-Soviet space.  Russia’s assertive behavior in the ‘near 
abroad’ and its self-perception as a ‘big brother’ have limited the interaction of newly 
independent states with western countries, impeding processes for democratic development 
and supporting ill-governments in post-Soviet states. 
 
                                                          
3
 King, Charles. “The Five-Day War.” Foreign Affairs, 87.6 (Nov/Dec 2008): 2-11. 
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Research Question and Argument  
Taking into consideration discussions about Kosovo as a precedent for the use of 
force by Russia against Georgia over South Ossetia, as well as about Russia’s real intentions 
in preserving peace and stability in post-Soviet space, I attempt to explore the key foreign 
policy interests of the US and Russia, and how these interests were expressed during the US-
led NATO military interventions into the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and Russia’s incursion 
into Georgia in 2008.  The paper compares and reveals similar and different approaches 
undertaken in diplomatic efforts with the level of involvement of multilateral organizations 
during the peace-mediation process and in the decisions to use force. This study will attempt 
to provide an understanding of what drives major powers, without a comprehensive UN 
Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, to undertake such large-scale, risky, 
and expensive military interventions in sovereign countries. 
The study endeavors to uncover any other motivations hidden behind the argument of 
‘protecting ethnic groups from ethnic cleansing,’ which was used in both cases as 
justification.  Additionally, the analysis reveals the role of the US in the Russo-Georgian 
conflict, as well as role of Russia during the Kosovo crisis, because the US and Russia were 
engaged in both conflicts, even though their roles were opposite to each other. 
I believe that a comparison and analysis of the methods and tactics used by the US 
and Russia in the promotion of their national interests in regional conflicts is of strategic 
importance in predicting Russia’s future actions in response to other regional conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space.   I hold that a decisive counter-offensive attack on Georgia sends a strong 
message to other post-Soviet republics, in particular to Ukraine, about possible outcomes if 
the ‘near abroad’ continues to seek close relations with the West.  It is a signal to the US and 
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Europe that the post-Soviet space is Russia’s ‘zone of influence,’ and that without its 
permission no other country has the right to build partnerships and friendly relations with its 
‘protectorates.’   
At first glance it seems that the NATO intervention into Serbia in 1999 and the 
Russian intervention into Georgia in 2008 are similar.  Such an argument might be based on 
the fact that the former Yugoslavia, like Georgia, was experiencing interethnic conflict.  Both 
countries’ conflicts were rooted in aggressive national policies against ethnic minorities, 
which led to social, political, and economic inequality and resulted in the creation of 
vehement separatist movements.  Structural violence, including institutionalized poverty and 
discrimination against ethnic minorities, widened divisions.  Both military interventions 
could be said to be illegitimate due to the absence of the comprehensive endorsement of a 
United Nations Security Council resolution.  In both cases “protection of ethnic groups from 
cleansing” was considered the official reason for military intervention.  However, this study 
exposes the fact that the humanitarian reason took a backseat to other key motives and was 
mainly used to gain public support and as international justification.  The analysis discloses 
that the US’s and Russia’s involvement in the conflicts were largely motivated by the 
promotion of strategic and geopolitical interests, the securing of leadership positions, and 
domination in Europe and the post-Soviet space.   
US involvement in the Kosovo crisis was motivated by two main factors.  The first 
factor relates to preserving regional security in the Balkans and Europe.  Being committed to 
NATO and its allies in Europe, Washington was concerned by refugee flow and war 
atrocities in Kosovo, which meant the possibility of the spreading of conflict into 
neighboring countries, and therefore of threats to peace and stability in Europe.  The second 
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factor was to secure NATO’s credibility and determine its new role in the post-cold war 
world.  Defining a new role for NATO was a strategic issue for the US because through 
NATO it could secure a leadership position in Europe, which would allow for the promotion 
of the US’s economic and political interests in the region and elsewhere.  The Kosovo crisis 
was an opportunity for the US to demonstrate NATO’s credibility and capability to secure 
peace and stability in the region.  The effective military intervention into Kosovo made it 
clear to Western European countries that without the US’s technological capabilities and 
resources the protection of national security would be challenging.  NATO’s failure to act 
decisively in the crisis could have provoked discussions and undermined its future role in 
Europe.  In that case Washington risked losing a tool for maintaining its leadership position 
in Europe and elsewhere, and for pursuing its own national interests.   
Russia’s incursion into Georgia has been motivated by mainly geostrategic reasons 
that combine local, regional, and geopolitical interests.4  These interests include maintaining 
protectorates such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, exercising a predominant position in the 
region through political and economic influence, and sending a message to the West about 
Russia’s growing status as a great power and as a counterweight to the presence of the US 
and NATO in the post-Soviet space.  The preservation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
protectorates was needed for securing Russia’s strategic economic and politico-military 
interests, which would allow Russia to secure its presence in Georgia.  Moscow’s presence in 
Georgia is of strategic importance for exercising Russia’s political influence and opposing 
the possible location of US or NATO military forces in the region.  For Russia, presence in 
                                                          
4
 Allison, Roy. “Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’.” International Affairs 84.6 
(2008): 1145-1171. <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12445_84_6allison.pdf>. 
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the region is also beneficial for keeping economic influence by controlling energy 
transportation, thus undermining European attempts to build an alternative energy pipeline.  
Nevertheless, my research reveals differences between NATO’s military intervention 
into the former Yugoslavia and the incursion of Russia into Georgia.  The distinctive 
differences are seen in the respective peace-mediation processes with the involvement of 
multilateral institutions, as well as in the peacekeeping operations.  Prior to military 
intervention into Kosovo, the US and NATO member states undertook lengthy multistage 
mediation and negotiation processes with the wide involvement of international institutions 
such as the UN, the Contact Group, and the OSCE.  UNSC Resolution 1199 recognized that 
the crisis in Kosovo presented a threat to stability and security in the region.5  Another UNSC 
Resolution 1203 endorsed and supported signed agreements between the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) and the OSCE and between the FRY and NATO on establishing an OSCE 
monitoring verification mission and NATO air verification mission over Kosovo.6  The 
decision to use force was made multilaterally based on a consensus among NATO member 
states; however, the comprehensive authorization of the United Nations Security Council was 
lacking.  The main cause of the lack of authorization was Russia’s veto power at the UNSC.  
Even though Russia played an insider role in assisting in the negotiation process with the 
Serbian leadership, the Kremlin actively opposed the possibility of the use of force by NATO 
against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  The main reason for such opposition was the 
affirmation that Kosovo was an internal matter of, and therefore the problem should be 
solved by, the FRY government.  The Kremlin’s position might be explained by the fact that 
                                                          
5
 UNSC Resolution 1199. UNSC S/RES/1199. 23 September 1998. 17 Feb. 2009 
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm>  
6
 UNSC Resolution 1203. UN S/RES/1203. 24 October 1998. 17 Feb. 2009. 
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm>  
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Russia had a separatist problem in Chechnya at that time.  Moscow’s stance was closely 
linked with aspirations to preserve its great power status.  Accordingly Russia, along with 
China, warned the US and the EU that it would use its veto power and prevent them from 
obtaining permission from the UNSC to conduct military intervention into the territory of the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  In light of this warning, NATO did not appeal to the UNSC 
in order to get comprehensive Security Council authorization to conduct military 
intervention.  This case serves as evidence of Russia’s use of UNSC veto power as a tool for 
maintaining its national interests.  
In 1991-1992, the first armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia took place.  
On 24 June 1992, Russia played the role of mediator and brokered a ceasefire agreement in 
Sochi between warring parties that led to the deployment of the tripartite Joint Peacekeeping 
Force (JPKF) with Georgian, Russian, and North Ossetian units, and a limited observation 
mandate of the OSCE. 7  Deployment of joint Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian 
peacekeeping forces to the conflict zone successfully restricted international involvement.  
Only bilateral pace-negotiation was conducted by Moscow, before deployment of the 
tripartite peace keeping forces (Russia, Georgia and Ossetia).    
After the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in May 1994, the UN and Russia signed the 
Moscow Agreement which established the CIS Peacekeeping Forces (CISPKF).  However, 
the peacekeeping force of 2,000 peacekeepers and military observers were composed 
exclusively of Russian forces, unlike the JPKF in Ossetia.  The Moscow Agreement also 
provided the conditions for the deployment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG) with the task of observing the implementation of the agreement.  Thus, in 
                                                          
7
 OSCE mission in Georgia activated in December 1992 after Georgia applied to the CSCE HQ in Vienna with 
a request for mediation assistance.  The initial objectives of the OSCE mission were to liaise with peacekeeping 
force, to monitor situation and to promote negotiations in order to reach peaceful solution.  
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Georgia peace-mediation and peacekeeping operations were under the obvious domination of 
Russia with limited involvement of international organizations and therefore cannot be seen 
as equivalent to United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia or Kosovo.  The role of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the peace-mediation process is under doubt 
due to a vague initial structure and the apparent domination by Russia in the decision making 
process.  Thus, Russian leadership decided to use force against Georgia unilaterally, without 
any consultations with the CIS or support from multilateral institutions.   
Lastly, the Kosovo crisis was not generated by the NATO alliance or the US.  Third-
party involvement came later and the airstrike against Serbia was provoked by the 
deterioration of the situation and escalation of ethnic cleansing.  In addition, the US and the 
NATO alliance did not support Albanians in Kosovo, unlike Russia, who supported 
breakaway regions by backing separatist movements and distributing Russian citizenship to 
South Ossetians.8  Thereby Russia took a dominant role in the conflict between Georgia, 
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, and was mainly focused on pursuing its own geopolitical 
interest rather than on helping Georgia solve the problem with its breakaway region.  
  
Methodology 
This research explores three categories: (1) the strategic interests and motives for the 
US’s and Russia’s military interventions, (2) the level of international institutions’ 
involvement in the peace-mediation process, and (3) the decisions to use force.  
                                                          
8
 Mackinlay, John and Sharov, Evgenii. “Russian Peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” Regional Peacekeepers: 
The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. Eds. Mackinlay John and Cross Peter. United Nations University Press: 
Tokyo-New York-Paris, 2003. 63-87. 
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The broad foreign policy interests of the United States and the Russian Federation 
were divided into two periods: the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s.  Also each 
country’s national interests and motives to intervene were examined in the respective 
regions: Kosovo and Georgia.   
The US’s and Russia’s participation in multilateral organizations and level of 
engagement of these institutions in diplomatic efforts were studied.  The role of regional and 
international institutions in the promotion of the US’s and Russia’s national interests in 
regional conflict management were studied as well.   
Taking into account that both military interventions were conducted without 
comprehensive UNSC authorization, the study explores how the decisions to use force were 
made and on what basis.  This study reveals a considerable difference between the two cases.  
In the Kosovo case the decision was multilateral based on a consensus between NATO 
member states.  On the other hand, in the Georgia case the decision was made unilaterally by 
Russia without consultation with CIS member states. 
 
Organization of the thesis 
The organization of this thesis is as follows.  Chapter 1 presents the research question, 
argument, and methodology of the study.  Chapter 2 will examine the broad and region-
oriented foreign policy interests of the United States and Russian Federation.  Later, the 
chapter describes the participation of the US and Russia in regional and international 
multilateral organizations, as well as differences in their understandings of a multilateral 
approach in solving interethnic conflicts.   
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Chapter 3 will discuss the possible strategic motives that drove Washington into the 
Kosovo crisis.  The process of interest realization through negotiation and mediation 
processes with the involvement of regional and international institutions will be discussed as 
well.  Also, the chapter will illustrate the role of Russia in the peace-mediation process and 
its position on the Kosovo issue.  In addition, the wide engagement of the international 
community and the presence of a previous UNSC resolution allowing for the establishment 
of a NATO verification air mission over Kosovo and OSCE’s monitoring mission, which led 
to the conclusion that the decision on “Operation Allied Force in Kosovo” was based on 
multilateral consensus, will be discussed.  This, incidentally, is the main difference between 
NATO’s military intervention into Kosovo and Russia’s intervention into Georgia.   
 Chapter 4 will discuss the motives of the Russian counter-offensive attack on Georgia 
in August 2008, as well as the role of Russia in Caucasian conflicts, in particular the 
Georgia-Ossetia conflict.  Russia’s dominant position in negotiations and peacekeeping 
processes created limitations on international involvement in the conflict, which played a 
negative role in solving the root causes of the conflict and resulted in Russia’s active 
participation in fueling tensions in order to advance its national interests.  Russia’s perception 
of Georgia as a “territory with special interests” influenced its unilateral decision to intervene 
through the use of force with the aim of restoring its political and military presence.  This 
situation created all the necessary conditions for escalation of the conflict and threatening 
European peace and stability.  This war raised many questions about the effectiveness of 
security policies in Europe and the international system of preservation of the territorial 
integrity of a sovereign state.  Also, chapter 4 depicts the role of the US in increasing 
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tensions between Russian and Georgia, which led to a situation in which US and Russian 
interests conflicted and caused a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations.   
Finally, in the conclusion I summarize the vital and strategic interests of the US and 
Russia in both regions, and review differences and similarities in the engagement of 
multilateral institutions in peace-mediation processes and decisions to use force.  The Russia- 
monopolized “mediator” role in interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space indicates that 
Russia will use ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ methods to influence and promote its national interests in 
the near abroad in order to counterbalance the US’s interests. 
Now we turn to chapter 2 where will be discussed foreign policy interests of the 
United States and Russia in a broad and regions oriented context.  The foreign policy 
interests will be divided into vital and strategic national interests.  In addition, in the chapter 
portrays the role of regional and international institutions in the promotion of US and Russian 
national interests in regional conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
In order to understand the motives behind military intervention it is important to 
examine the foreign policy interests of the US and Russia in the 1990s and into this century.  
National interest refers to the self-interest of a nation-state, defined as a state’s goal or vision 
for the defense and projection of its power beyond its borders in order to pursue economic 
growth and power.9  Foreign policy is a strategy or set of goals designed to interact with 
other countries on economic, political, cultural, social, and military issues, as well as with 
non-state actors.  As a rule, these interactions attempt to take a full advantage of the benefits 
of multilateral international cooperation.  Foreign policy is closely linked with national 
interest because it is developed in order to protect a country’s national interest, security, 
ideology, and economic prosperity. 
The paper divides national interests into two groups: vital and strategic interests. 
Vital interests concern survival issues and could affect the security and economic future of a 
country.  Vital interests require total military mobilization and readiness to conduct war in 
order to protect and defend a country’s welfare, as well as the regions that directly affect its 
security interests.  Strategic interests include concerns that do not affect issues of survival or 
present a threat to the nation, but have the potential to become vital over an extended period 
                                                          
9
 Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Wheeler, Nicholas J. “Introduction: the changing ethics of power beyond borders.” 
National Interest and International Solidarity: Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life. Eds. 
Coicaud Jean-Marc and Wheeler Nicholas J. UN University Press: Tokyo-New York-Paris, 2008. 1-24. 
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of time.  In addition, pursuing strategic interests facilitates obtaining political, economic, and 
military advantages to keep a hegemonic position, either regionally or globally.  
 
National Interests and Foreign Policy of the United States 
Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala define the national interests of the United States as 
“… expressions of US values projected into the international and domestic arena. The 
purpose of interests includes the creation and perpetuation of an international environment 
that is most favorable to the peaceful pursuit of US values.  It follows that interest’s nurture 
and expand democracy and open systems.”10 This definition emphasizes the vital role of 
American values in the formulation of the principles of the US political-social system upon 
which national interests are based.  Promotion of American values and national security 
interests requires projection of power into different parts of the globe.   
US foreign policy is not defined only by the ruling leadership.  American foreign 
policy is developed through the close interaction of societal forces and the institutional 
branches that were established by the US Constitution.  The societal force concept embraces 
the broad viewpoints and orientations of the American people that consist of “… shared 
ideas, ideals, concepts, stories and myths that orient citizens within their political systems.”11  
At the institutional level foreign policy materializes as a result of interaction between two 
parts of the institutional establishment—the President of the United States within the 
executive branch and the US Congress.  Each of these institutions influences foreign policy 
                                                          
10
 Sarkesian, Sam, and Williams, John Allen, and Cimbala, Stephen J. US National Security: Policymakers, 
Processes and Politics. Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 2008. pp. 8-9. 
11
 James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers. “Out of the Cold: The post-Cold War Context of U.S, Foreign Policy.” 
After the end: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World.  Ed. James M. Scott, Duke University 
Press: Durham-London, 1998. p. 3. 
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formation and its implementation.  Public opinion and its consent in implementing certain 
policies plays a crucial role in the policies launched by the government.  After the end of 
World War II and up until end of the Cold War, the US’s key foreign policy interests 
included containment of the Soviet Union, prevention of the spread of communist ideology, 
and promotion of a global economy under US leadership.  At that time, defining national 
interest was clear-cut and every foreign policy decision was seen through this ideological 
prism.  For most of the twentieth century and today, US foreign policy has been driven by 
geopolitics and the prevention of domination by any strategic power in the world.  
With the dissolution of the USSR, serious challenges of territorial domination ended 
and the principal goal of American policy was achieved.  Once the Cold War ended it 
became more difficult to define national interests and to translate them into coherent foreign 
policy objectives.  Such difficulties occurred due to the unpredictable, uncertain, and 
unstable situation in the world.  The new era demanded new ways of thinking and new 
approaches in the formulation of strategies, policies, and concepts.  In the 1990s, US foreign 
policy had very broad multiple political, economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests.  
Convinced that the major war threat was reduced, US policy was directed to solving 
domestic problems and in 1991 was engaged in the Gulf War to protect Kuwait from Iraq.  
Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala describe the Clinton’s administration grand 
strategy as that of “engagement and enlargement.” 12  One of the vital interests for 
Washington in the 1990s was defining a new role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in European affairs and continuing to build strong partnerships with European 
allies, thus securing US hegemony and leadership.   
                                                          
12
 Sarkesian, Sam, and Williams, John Allen, and Cimbala, Stephen J. US National Security: Policymakers, 
Processes and Politics. Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 2008. p. 225. 
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Building a strong partnership between itself and Europe is another vital interest for 
the US.  For America, Europe is considered a key region for maintaining a strong US 
economy, and for obtaining the support of allies that gives the US leverage in advancing its 
political and economic interest around the globe.  The US and its European allies have 
cultivated strong economic ties which increase employment opportunities, as well as provide 
trade and profitable investment opportunities for Americans.  The US engagement in 
Europe’s security issues and in expanding stable zones decreases the threat to stability and 
creates a secure environment that fosters economic benefits and results in reducing defense 
costs and increases the possibility of promoting its vital economic interests.  For example, 
according to Institute for National Strategic Studies about 50percent of the US’s direct 
investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60 percent of foreign direct investment in the US is 
from Europe.13  A strong US economy became a unified objective that intertwined economics 
and politics. 
Among strategic interests, these include issues of the protection of the homeland from 
nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), or conventional military attack, as well as the 
prevention of any hostile power from dominating Europe, the Middles East, Asia, or the high 
seas. 
 
US interests in Kosovo  
The United States was engaged in the Yugoslav crisis in 1994 as a member of both 
NATO and the United Nations Security Council.  Despite efforts of European countries in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation deteriorated in Bosnia and the US was a high profile 
                                                          
13
 Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs. “United States Security Strategy for Europe 
and NATO.” 19 Mar. 2009 <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/europe/index.html>.  
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participant in the negotiation process and played a decisive role in stopping the war in Bosnia 
by assisting in signing the Dayton agreement in 1995.  NATO was used as a peacemaking 
tool during the war and replaced the UN peacekeeping personnel afterwards.  
On 24 March 1999, NATO, backed by the US, launched a 78 day air campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  In that military intervention, NATO used 
sustained force for the first time in the history of the alliance.  It involved the large-scale use 
of air force operations against the Yugoslav state’s army and resulted in policy changes by 
the Yugoslav government.   NATO and its allies justified the military campaign with 
overwhelming humanitarian reasons, notably stopping the killing and expulsion of the 
Albanian population in Kosovo by Serbian paramilitary and law-enforcement forces.   
US involvement in the Kosovo crisis was motivated by two interests.  First, the issue 
of NATO’s credibility in its new role in European affairs was vital to American politics in 
the 1990s.  Having engaged in international diplomacy over the Kosovo crisis and having 
made military threats to Belgrade over the continuation of atrocities, NATO member states 
could have lost confidence in the credibility and capability of NATO to guarantee peace and 
security in the region if Milošević refused to agree to a diplomatic solution.14  In addition, as 
a founder of NATO, the US was interested in the expression of NATO’s new mission in 
Euro-Atlantic political relations.  It was a vital interest to preserve US leadership in NATO in 
order to secure a continued leadership position in Europe, influence European security issues, 
and promote the US economy in Europe and beyond.15   
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Accordingly, President Clinton stated during his address to the nation prior to 
intervention into the Former Republic of Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999 that “Kosovo is 
about the US’s relation with Western Europe.”16  The US commitment to multilateralism in 
NATO resulted in the transformation of the institution from a regional defense-alliance to a 
peacemaking mechanism and ensured a leadership role for the US, allowing it to promote its 
national interests within a multilateral framework in regional conflict.  Preserving NATO as 
an instrument for maintaining a leadership position in Europe and beyond was a key interest 
for the US rather than saving Kosovo per se.  With Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 
February 2008, it is a matter of honor for the US and EU to provide sustained support for the 
promotion of democratic principles and establishment of the rule of law in Kosovo, in order 
to ensure sustainable development in the Balkan region. 
The second interest was preserving regional security in the Balkans.  The situation in 
Kosovo threatened international peace and security due to the intensification of war atrocities 
and ethnic cleansing that generated refugee flows.  Large refugee flows from Kosovo into 
neighboring countries were considered a destabilizing factor for Europe and a potential 
source for the conflict to spill over into neighboring countries.17  Indeed, according to 
UNHCR (March 1, 1998-March 24, 1999) about 100,000 Kosovo Albanians left the region 
before NATO’s campaign.18 
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US interests in Georgia  
The region of the Southern Caucasus, with its three sovereign countries Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia, takes one of the central places in the promotion of US foreign 
policy.  US strategic interests are focused on several issues, such as the promotion of 
freedom and democracy, energy security, counterterrorism, and the peaceful resolution of 
“frozen conflicts.”  Georgia plays a significant role in US strategic geopolitical and economic 
interests in terms of energy security, counterterrorism, averting great power domination and 
NATO enlargement.  
The strategic economic interest is concerned with the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline that goes through Georgian territory from the Caspian Sea and 
Central Asia to Turkey and ultimately to Europe and the US.  BTC is the only regional transit 
route that avoids Russia and Iran.  The 1,100-mile long pipeline started service in 2006 and 
pumps up to 1 million barrels of oil per day from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Yumurtalik, Turkey.  
In Georgian territory the BTC stretches 154.7 miles.19  There is also the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) pipeline that transports natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field in 
Azerbaijan to Turkey.  The BTE pipeline started its first deliveries on December 15, 2006.20   
Bernard Gelb refers to the estimates of BP and the Energy Information 
Administration of the US Department of Energy and points out that the Caspian Sea is a 
significant but not major source of crude oil to the world market.21  To put things in 
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perspective, in 2005 the Caspian Sea’s energy production was 1.9 million barrels per day 
(only 2percent of total world output), while each country within the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries produces more than 1.9 million barrels per day.22  However, 
by BP’s estimates the Caspian basin has on reserve about 48 billion barrels of oil, which is 
about 4percent of world reserves, compared to the US’s estimated 29 billion barrels of 
reserves.23  Gelb points out that gas reserves in the Caspian region are higher, proportionally, 
than those of oil; thus, BP estimates confirm that the Caspian region has 4percent of the 
world’s total in gas reserves.24  Thereby the Caspian Sea contains more energy resources than 
it produces and as a consequence, it is of long-term importance.   
The region is attractive for other energy-thirsty countries such as Turkey and China. 
Considering that the Caspian basin is a landlocked region, Russia has monopolized energy 
transit, controlling the majority of energy routes from the Caspian reserves.  In addition, with 
the difficulties of post-war Iraq and the deterioration of relations with Iran, the importance of 
the Caspian region and Central Asia has increased.  In this regard the BTC pipeline became 
an additional, however not main, source for energy supply that reduces heavy reliance for oil 
on the Middle East and Russia.  Georgia as a transit country plays an important role for Euro-
Atlantic society because its geographic location serves as an option for a non-Russian export 
route and provides an important access point to the northern borders of Middle East and 
Central Asian energy resources.25  Therefore, the preservation of stability in the region will 
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make access of Caspian energy resources to the global market easier, thereby diversifying 
energy resources and releasing monopolistic pressure.   
Another strategic interest of the US is to prevent great power domination in the 
region.  The US is concerned about Russian aspirations to influence and dominate in the 
region.  In this regard, Washington tries to counterbalance the Kremlin’s ambitions by 
providing considerable support in the implementation of reforms and promotion of 
democracy in Georgia, and encouraging Georgia in finding peaceful ways to solve separatist 
conflicts.  The US considers the promotion of democracy in countries in transition to be 
indispensable to America’s own national security, since the United States does not feel fully 
secure when undemocratic countries dominate in the world.   
Within the framework of support for democratic reforms in Georgia, the United 
States provided assistance in the modification and restructuring of the Georgian defense 
system and trained the Georgian military within the framework of the Georgian Train and 
Equip Program (GTEP).26  This training program was in line with the US’s vital interest in 
the “war on terror” as well as in enhancing Georgian counter-terrorism capabilities and 
addressing the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.  According to numerous intelligence data, 
terrorists supported by international terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, remain 
there.27  In turn, Georgia has provided military forces that support the peacekeeping missions 
in Iraq under Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ and in Kosovo, KFOR.  
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US support of Georgia in obtaining NATO membership is directly linked with the 
strategic interest of averting of great power domination and in line with the US policy on 
NATO enlargement in Europe.  The US considers the NATO enlargement process to be a 
contribution to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.  For America it is 
strategically important to maintain NATO as a capable and successful alliance with a strong 
adherence to its principles.   
 
United States Participation in Multilateral Organizations 
For Washington unilateralism is a preferred form of action due to its technological 
and material capacity.  According to Clement, the United States is inclined to use a 
multilateral framework when it needs political support for legitimizing its actions. 28  
Generally the United States tends to include its allies and partners who share its ideas and 
interests, and are able to contribute to common efforts.  For the US, the NATO alliance is a 
great example of a permanent, multilateral framework with a group of credible, reliable, and 
loyal states that allows the US to promote its national political and economic interests. 
 
Membership in the UN 
The United States is a member of the United Nations (UN) with a permanent seat on 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since its establishment after World War II.  
Washington played a great role in designing the United Nations system.  The US views the 
UNSC rather than the General Assembly as the main decision making platform on key 
security issues. The UNSC is the only UN body that has the primary authority to deal with 
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issues concerning international peace and security that are reflected in the United Nations 
Charter.  With the end of the Cold War the US emerged as the only superpower due to its 
financial, technological, and military capabilities, which resulted in distortion of the 
structural balance in the UN scheme. 
The United States is considered the most dominant actor in the Security Council due 
to its technological, financial, and military capacities.  As a consequence of the end of the 
Cold War, the balance shifted from interstate conflicts to internal warfare, which demanded 
new approaches in UN peacekeeping operations.  The majority of those internal armed 
conflicts have been based on the issue of self-determination.  The success of the UN 
peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts is unlikely to succeed without strong US 
backing, due to the US’s dominant position in the UN.  Before engaging in one of the new 
types of conflict, Washington’s decision-makers first of all question whether it is in the US’s 
security and political interests to respond to these distant conflicts and what approach should 
be taken in order to respond to the conflict unilaterally, through a UN peace operation, or not 
at all.  In addition, US leadership considers the consequences of this choice on the authority 
and capacity of the UN to keep peace, and whether the choice would have any rebound 
effects on the US itself.29  
A permanent seat with veto power at the UNSC gives the United States, along with 
the other four SC permanent members, tremendous power to exercise.  In this manner the US 
has actively used veto power in order to protect itself against decisions that have opposed its 
interests.  Washington has exercised veto power in the Security Council largely on issues 
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related to the Arab-Israeli conflicts and to impose targeted and comprehensive sanctions 
against, for instance, such countries as Yugoslavia at the time of the Kosovo crisis.  Very 
often due to veto power the UNSC becomes paralyzed and is unable to respond rapidly and 
decisively to the world’s challenges.   
 
Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
The US took active part in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 4 
April 1949 as a military alliance between North America and Europe.  The primary role of 
the organization during the Cold War was to defend Europe and North America from 
possible attacks by any nation or group of nations (Soviet threat), promote peace and 
security, and maintain the military balance in the region.30  Today NATO is an alliance of 26 
countries from North America and Europe with the fundamental role of safeguarding the 
freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.  The principal 
decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council; NATO decisions are based on a 
consensus between all member states.  Such a decision making process compels the US to 
undertake bilateral and multilateral consultations with all member states in order to develop a 
consensus on a particular decision. 31  NATO has the military, material, and political 
leadership capacity that allows it to fulfill its main mission in Europe and beyond.  However, 
the technological capability of the US and its ability to conduct military operations ensures 
its leadership role in NATO and allows it to pursue national interests within a multilateral 
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framework.  Thus, the United States uses NATO as a tool in maintaining its leadership role in 
Europe; in turn, its presence ensures NATO’s credibility as a central European security 
institution.  In addition, Washington sees in NATO a prime multilateral framework for 
legitimizing its activities, which allows for the promotion of its political and economic 
interests.  In turn, for NATO member states it is beneficial to use the US’s capacities in 
ensuring peace and stability in Europe.  Thus, during the Kosovo crisis, NATO became the 
prime multilateral institution able to obtain legitimacy for military action because the UN 
Security Council was paralyzed by the threat of Russia’s and China’s veto powers.  Russia 
and China strongly considered the Kosovo crisis to be a purely internal problem of the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia and therefore that use of force against a sovereign state 
would violate its territorial integrity.   
In the 1990s NATO was significantly reoriented through organizational changes in 
four areas: ‘internal adaptation’, ‘external adaptation’, ‘peace support’, and ‘crisis 
management and response’.32   Internal adaptation was mainly concerned with rebalancing 
relations with member states; specifically, the issue of NATO enlargement raised questions 
about establishing new decision-making procedures, because consensus-based decisions 
would become difficult with an increased number of members.  Another issue of internal 
adaptation was the creation of a mechanism which allows the undertaking of military 
operations without the direct participation of US forces.  This discussion resulted in the 
establishment in 1994 of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), with the idea of deploying 
flexible military forces by a ‘coalition of the willing.’   
The ‘external adaptation’ process was related to the establishment of relations 
between NATO and non-member states.  In 1994, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace 
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(PfP) process, which was in line with the external adaptation framework, notably with 
Russia.  NATO’s third unplanned peace support role took place with the arising of violent 
conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  In this way NATO’s troops and 
command resources were deployed in Bosnia during the violence.  In addition, after signing 
the Dayton agreement in 1995, NATO played a central peacekeeping role in Bosnia along 
with the OSCE and the UN.  The fourth role of NATO in response to a crisis came with the 
use of military force, without a UNSC resolution, in 1999 under Operation Allied Force, 
which was aimed at coercing the Serbian leadership to peace in Kosovo, similar to the 1995 
air strikes in Bosnia against Bosnian Serb positions near Sarajevo.  This new role of the 
alliance was called ‘crisis management and response’ at a NATO summit in Washington in 
April 1999.33    
 
Membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
 The US has a seat in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), which is the largest regional security organization in the world.  The OSCE is a 
platform for political negotiations and decision-making in the field of early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in the region.  The OSCE has 
a network of field missions around Europe and Central Asia that enables participating states 
to put their political will into practice.34   
The OSCE is an organization that positions the US, Russia, and European countries 
on a level surface and bring together states from the west and east.  It is a forum where all 56 
member states have an opportunity to work closely on issues of common interests and make 
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decisions by consensus.  The OSCE as a multilateral organization has a specific set of 
capacities such as mediation power in a conflict situation, institution-building in a post-
conflict environment, and information dissemination in democratic processes, like elections.  
Thus the organization took a special position with regards to the Balkan wars in post-conflict 
rehabilitation, resettlement of refugees, establishment of electoral systems, and reforming the 
local police.  In addition, the OSCE was present in Kosovo as an international monitoring 
organization before NATO’s military intervention into the former Yugoslavia.  In contrast to 
NATO, the US uses the OSCE as an instrument for the promotion of security and peace in 
the region by non-military means.  
 
National Interests and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
Foreign policy formation and implementation in contemporary Russia is affected by 
an imperial and totalitarian past.  Andrei Tsygankov argues that Russian interaction with the 
world depends upon its own unique patterns of thinking and behavior, because throughout 
history the Russian response to national security threats was similar and resulted in the 
development of three main groups of interests: neighboring countries, external threat of 
invasion, and preservation of state integrity.35   
Tsygankov states that such historical developments resulted in the emergence of three 
schools of foreign policy making: westernizers, statists, and civilizationists, or so-called 
eurasianists.  Westernizers affiliate themselves with the West and share Western values such 
as democracy, human rights, freedom, and free market. 36  Statists strongly believe that only 
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the state, without external assistance, is able to preserve the political, economic, and social 
order.  Statists value strong state power, independence, and stability, and they sturdily 
believe that Russia’s national security is under the threat.  Such a perception moves Russia 
toward great power ambitions and enables it to respond to challenges and threats from the 
inside and out.  In foreign policy, the vital interest is associated with promotion of Russia’s 
greatness and demonstration of its strength. 37  Civilizationists are characterized as hard-line 
politicians and intellectuals who recognize widespread expansion as an approach to 
guarantee national security.  To Civilizationists, the dissemination of Russian values is 
important in challenging the Western system of values.  Civilizationists believe that the 
expansion of territory and dissemination of their values is competition for power against the 
West, in particular the US.38  
 To Tsygankov, Russian foreign policy formulation and its implementation depends 
upon the political establishment following a particular school of thought.39  With the 
dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s, Russia lost its superpower position in the world 
and was engaged in political, economic, and social transformation.  The new Russian 
leadership under Yeltsin was devoted to developing a pro-Western vision of national identity 
and motivated by initiating democratic reforms with the aim to integrate with the West.  At 
that time national interest consisted of three main components.  The first component was 
related to the conducting of radical economic and political reforms by investing resources in 
the creation of a modern economy without fear of military threat or geopolitical interests.  
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The second component was joining international organizations and becoming a full member 
of the transatlantic economic and security community (such organizations as the OSCE, 
NATO, the G-7, and others).  Finally, the last component was related to the economic, 
political, and cultural separation of Russia from the former Soviet republics.  The Russian 
leadership considered the former republics to be a heavy burden to the economy.  In this 
regard Moscow aimed to gradually withdraw the army and military equipment from the 
territories of the former republics and relied on assistance from international organizations in 
solving the local conflicts that occurred in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.  With the 
intention to “divorce” the former Soviet republics in a civilized way, Russia played a great 
role in establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991.  The CIS was 
also meant to be a platform for economic and cultural integration among the former Soviet 
republics.40   
Thus, in 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation prepared a 
new concept of foreign policy that denied imperial ambitions and placed its trust in the 
Western concept and support.41  However, due to weak economic capabilities the new 
strategy did not work.  People’s growing dissatisfaction with the declining economy, the 
worsening standard of living, and skepticism toward the new reforms resulted in the 
intensification of the opposition.  Such developments led toward the strengthening of the 
state’s role and the revitalization of the ‘great Russia’ status.  External and internal threats to 
Russian security considerably affected the revival of great power status ambitions.  The war 
in Chechnya undermined the country’s stability from the inside.  Ethnic conflicts that 
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occurred in the “near abroad” threatened Russia’s security from the outside, such as brutal 
fights between Georgians and South Ossetians, Georgians and Abkhazians, and disputes 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno Karabakh region.  In addition, despite 
Russia’s protests, NATO’s expansion toward the east became a factor reinforcing the power 
of the statist school and the cooling of relations with the West.   
An even more assertive and solid stance emerged with the appointment of Yevgeny 
Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996.  A fundamental part the definition of national interest 
at the end of 1990s was related to securing great power status, counterbalancing the United 
States, and promoting the concept of a multipolar international system.42  The concept of 
multipolarity became central to Russia’s foreign policy and promoted the conditions needed 
to be a counterweight to US hegemonic aspirations.43  However, the great power balance 
policy did not create favorable conditions for economic development and did not improve the 
well-being of Russians.  The policy turned out to be purely geopolitical, which resulted in a 
worsening economic situation, increased foreign debt, and a decline in foreign investments.44  
During Yeltsin’s rule, foreign policy decision-making was chaotic and inconsistent due to in-
fighting among different groups and the promotion of interests through the President’s 
favorites.45   
                                                          
42
 Karlsson, H. “The United States and Russia: A clash of strategic visions.” Changing Transatlantic Security 
Relations: Do the US, the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle? Eds. Hallenberg, Jan and Karlsson, 
Hakan. Routledge: London and New York, 2006. 184-204. 
43
 Ambrosio, T. “Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era.” European Security 10.1 (Spring 2001): 45-67. 
44
 Tsygankov, Andrei.  Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006. 25. 
45
 Baev, Pavel K. “Russia’s Stance Against Secession: From Chechnya to Kosovo.” International Peacekeeping 
6.3 (1999): 73-94. 
 30
Putin inherited Russia at a difficult time, with the consequences of the 1998 economic 
crisis that paralyzed the economy and an external debt of $133 billion to Western banks and 
governments.46  Payment of the foreign debt and pursuing economic priorities was essential 
for Putin in order to restore Russia’s great power status.  Dependence on loans from Western 
banks and governments inevitably meant that Russia lost independence in the formulation of 
its own political course and sovereignty.  During his first years of rule Putin launched two 
main economic programs that resulted in paying off all Russian debt to the International 
Monetary Fund in the beginning of 2005, three and a half years ahead of schedule.47  The 
world price of oil also played an important part in increasing Russia’s wealth; the price rose 
from under $10 a barrel in 1998 to over $140 in 2008.48  Putin saw Russia’s gas and oil as a 
powerful foreign policy instrument and primary geopolitical asset.  Such an understanding 
led to the creation of conditions where the state took greater control over these resources.  
Putin’s consolidation of power and resources resulted in a consensus among the 
political elite about Russia’s identity and interests based on their perception of Putin.  Like 
any other country in the world, Russia’s first vital interest is to ensure the security of the 
country while preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The strategic interest of 
Putin’s Russia is attaining the status of major world power alongside the United States and 
China.  It is clearly stated in an official document on foreign policy formation, adopted in 
2000, that “… the Russian Federation is a great power and influential center in the modern 
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world.”49  Great power ambition is also emphasized in Putin’s article devoted to the 
consolidation of Russian society when he says that “Russia has been and will be a great 
power”.50  Great power status was directly linked to the cultivation of a Russian sphere of 
influence in the post-Soviet space, a region identified as a ‘zone of special responsibility and 
influence.’   
The next central interest is a continuation of the 1997 policy on the promotion of a 
multipolar world in order to balance “… a growing trend towards the establishment of a 
unipolar world order, with economic and power domination of the United States.”51  Moscow 
presents NATO enlargement, US missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, and the official US policy on democracy promotion as a serious threat to Russia’s 
national security.  These issues were clearly stated by Putin during his speech at a Munich 
conference in 2007.52  In addition, the presence of NATO forces in Central Asia, US military 
training in Georgia, and the desire of Georgia and Ukraine to obtain NATO’s Membership 
Action Plan are clearly irritating Russia and increasing its insecure feelings in regards to its 
geopolitical and national interests.  In order to keep multipolarity Russia aims to influence 
global processes through generally recognized international law (UN Charter) and 
institutions as the UN Security Council, where Russia has permanent member status.   
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 The election of Dmitri Medvedev as President of the Russian Federation in 2008 
offers little chance to anticipate that Russia will change its foreign policy and behavior.  On 
12 July 2008 Medvedev adopted a new foreign policy for the Russian Federation, which is 
not too far from Putin’s concepts of great power, multipolarity, and a new world order.53  
After the Russo-Georgian conflict the President of Russia underlined five main principles 
that will guide foreign policy and defend Russia’s national interests.  The first principle is the 
primacy of international law in developing and defining relations with other states (this 
principle seems to be elusive, due to Russia’s military action against sovereign Georgia).  
The second principle is a multipolar world, which means unacceptability by Russia of the 
primacy of one country (i.e. the US) in the determination of world policy.  The third principle 
of ‘no isolation’ might be interpreted as that Russia does not seek confrontations with the US 
and Europe and other countries; however, it requires that its interests should be met first.  
The next principle is the protection of the lives and dignity of Russian citizens ‘wherever 
they are’54 and the business community abroad.  Moscow warns that any aggressiveness 
toward its citizens will result in a quick protective response (as “it did in Georgia”).  Finally, 
the last principle demands a “sphere of influence,” especially over states on its border, where 
Russia has privileged interests.  Failure by other states to respect Russia’s interests in ‘zones 
of influence’ might be potential for further conflicts.55  
                                                          
53
 Ministerstvo Inostrannyh Del Rosii. “Koncepciya vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federacii.” 12 July 2008. 2 
March 2009 <http://www.mid.ru/ns-
osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d48737161a0bc944c32574870048d8f7?OpenDocument>. 
54
 There is a significant Russian diaspora in Georgia and in general throughout the post-Soviet space. 
55
 Reynolds, Paul. “New Russian world order: the five principles.” BBC News. 9 Sep. 2008. 8 Feb. 2009 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm>. 
 33
Realignment in Russian foreign policy and security policy is enduring and radical 
since 2000s.  Putin’s understanding of world order profoundly reappraised Russia’s national 
interests, reverted to old statist’s ambitions, and revived Russian nationalism.  Putin’s Russia 
has been concerned about more pragmatic relations with the West, i.e. aligning with most 
powerful states in international affairs, and motivated by protecting national security and 
national interests through mutually gainful cooperation.56    
 
Russia’s interests in Kosovo  
During Tsarist times, Russia had strategic, economic, and cultural interests in the 
Balkans.   Strategically, the empire’s leaders saw the Balkans as a security zone for Russian 
borders, which also allowed control of the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits for the promotion 
of commercial and economic development.  A second interest was related to pan-Slavism, 
the idea of the cultural and religious unity of all Slavic peoples.  However, Larrabee points 
out that pan-Slavic and Orthodox Christian interests never drove Russian policy in the 
Balkans as much as strategic and economic interests.57   
Great power status aspiration was a reason for Russia’s involvement in the Yugoslav 
crisis, which resulted in the return of assertiveness in Russian foreign policy in 1993.  The 
Yugoslav wars did not pose a threat to Russian security interests per se; it supported its 
Serbian ally based on great power ambition and vague Slavic ties.  Russia’s engagement in 
the Kosovo crisis was mainly to preserve its great power status in European affairs and 
constrain NATO’s influence.  
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NATO’s eastward expansion at the end of the 1990s was alarming to the Russian 
political establishment and created a feeling of threat to Russian interests and security.  In 
addition, in the mid 1990s, the Russian leadership clearly understood that NATO was 
becoming a foundation for European security.  Moscow perceived NATO expansion as a 
rejection of Russian integration into the western security organization and a refusal to keep a 
promise not to expand the alliance.  Putin stresses that during the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact, Western partners assured Soviet leaders that a NATO army would not be placed outside 
of German territory, and quotes the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in 
Brussels on May 17, 1990: “The fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside 
German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.”58  
Yuri Romanchenko interprets NATO’s action in the Balkans as a possible case-
scenario for the disintegration of Russia itself due to the growing separatist mood and 
movements in the Northern Caucasus and Tatarstan.59  He deeply believes that ethnic conflict 
in Yugoslavia was used by the US and NATO to strengthen their influence in the Balkans.  
Romanchenko states that the US’s refusal to participate in the beginning of Yugoslav wars 
and its ‘support for one of the warring parties’ resulted in constant destabilization of the 
region and intimidation of the other party by using force.60  
However, there might be strategic, economic, and geopolitical motives for Russia as 
well.  James Headley points out that Russia has economic interests in the Balkans.  Russia’s 
expansion to the territories of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia might have 
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strategic importance.  A corridor from the Black Sea and further to the Mediterranean would 
allow diversification of energy pipelines and provide other political and economic 
opportunities for Russia.61  Thus, natural gas supply was one of the tools that allowed Russia 
to be a player in European security affairs during the Yugoslav crisis.  
For the Kremlin, neither Kosovo itself, the Kosovo Serbs, nor the Kosovo Albanians 
mattered greatly.  The most vital interest for Russia in the Kosovo crisis was the issue of 
European security and relations with the West.  It seems that Russia sought recognition of its 
power status, which meant Russia’s involvement in the peace-mediation process and 
participation in multilateral organizations allowing the use of its veto power to oppose the 
plans of the West.  Russia was keen to preserve the territorial integrity of FRY, to prevent 
unwanted military intervention by western powers into the territory of a sovereign state, and 
to avert NATO’s presence inside the former Yugoslavia.  Such a stance was dictated by 
Russia’s internal problems, namely in Chechnya due to growing separatist movements.  
Moscow was not interested in creating a precedent for third party intervention.   
NATO’s intervention into Kosovo reinforced Russia’s perceptions about the alliance 
as a major threat to its security, in the form of the creation of Kosovo as a model for future 
actions, as well as increased feelings of isolation.  Such an understanding resulted in the 
redefining of military doctrine, an increase in budget spending on defense, maintaining the 
strength of the UNSC, and tightening the defense space in the territory of the former Soviet 
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Union.  In addition, NATO’s intervention into Kosovo triggered a stronger partnership with 
China and India against western powers.62  
 
Russian interests in Georgia 
Historically, Russia always had special interests in the Caucasus.  Since 1801, 
Georgia was under Russia’s control, with a brief period of independence after the Socialist 
revolution, before its reluctant incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921.  Despite being 
part of the Russian, then Soviet, empire for almost 200 years, Georgia’s inhabitants preserved 
a strong sense of national identity.  
Geographically, Georgia is linked to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Northern 
Caucasus within the Russian Federation.  Its geographic proximity to Russia positions 
Georgia as a special country with particular interests.  Russia has four distinct interests in 
Georgia, which can be summarized as regional stability, politico-military influence, 
“protection” of the Russian diaspora, and development of economic ties. 
 
Regional stability 
With the gaining of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has faced 
political turnover, social instability, economic difficulties, and interethnic and territorial 
conflicts.  However, the tension between South Ossetians and Abkhazians began as early as 
1989, when Georgia was still part of the Soviet Union.  Russia has an ambivalent attitude 
towards Georgia.  The unstable situation gives Russia the opportunity to maintain its 
influence in the country.  At the same time, however, instability in Georgia threatens security 
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in the Northern Caucasus and Chechnya, where Russia has problems with separatism and 
threats of radical religious extremism.  Instability on Russia’s frontier could have spill-over 
effects and endanger the unity of the Russian Federation.   
Until 1993 Moscow policy toward the region was passive and became reactive only 
in ad hoc situations.  In the early 1990s, when conflicts erupted between Georgia and South 
Ossetia and Georgia and Abkhazia, Russia was involved directly as a peace mediator and 
peacekeeper.  Moscow began to support separatist forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
when the Georgian leadership started to build a close relationship with the US.  Russia’s 
support of separatist regions inside Georgia aggravated the situation and created 
preconditions for the outbreak of open war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008.  It 
seems that the Kremlin wanted to weaken Georgia and gain more geopolitical and 
geoeconomic control over Transcaucasia.63  Georgia’s destabilization is in Russia’s strategic 
interest because Russia would achieve a much better tactical position, with closed access for 
the West in the use of ports and the energy transportation system that connects the Caspian 
Sea with the world market.  In addition, destabilization would impede the air corridor that 
serves NATO as a supply link to Afghanistan.  Under such conditions the West would seek 
support and make better deals with Russia in order to secure alternative supply roads.64 
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Politico-military interest 
Russia has a critical strategic interest in Georgia, since historically Georgian territory 
served as a “buffer zone” to protect the southern frontier of Russia and the Black Sea coast.   
During Soviet times the Transcaucasian military district was located across Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan.  After the Soviet dissolution, the Russian army inherited about 
1600 bases and facilities with ground troops and military bases of the Black Sea Fleet and 
border guards.65   
Initially Georgia did not demand immediate Russian military withdrawal from the 
country.  Negotiations about the withdrawal of military bases from Georgia started after 
Georgia’s defeat in the civil war with Abkhaz separatists in 1992.  The conflict between 
Georgia and Abkhazia resulted in the departure of about 250,000 Georgians from Abkhazia 
and left up to 10,000 dead.66  Georgians suspected Russian military assistance to the 
separatists and perceived Russia as an aggressor and a danger to Georgia’s territorial 
integrity.  In 1993 Russia restored its influence in Georgia and persuaded it to unite with the 
CIS, thus guaranteeing that Russian military bases would stay on Georgian territory.   
Nevertheless, in 1995 Tbilisi and Moscow signed an agreement about the withdrawal 
of military bases, which was never ratified by the Russian Duma.  Despite the lack of 
ratification, most of the bases were closed between 1997 and 1999.  The process of 
withdrawal was not easy due to strong criticism of the Kremlin by nationalist and communist 
leaders in Russia. In turn Russia demanded that Georgia would not allow military bases from 
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any other country on its territory after Russian withdrawal.  The Russian leadership was very 
much worried about the possible location of US or NATO bases. 67 
In 1999 four Russian bases remained on Georgian territory – Vaziani, Gudauta, 
Akhalkalaki, and Batumi.  During the OSCE’s Istanbul summit that year, Boris Yeltsin and 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze signed a statement regarding the future of the 
military bases.  According to the statement Vaziani and Gudauta would be closed in 2001, 
but only on the condition that the Russian military would have the right to use the military 
airport in Vaziani.  The Gudauta base in Abkhazia generated debate between Georgia and 
Russia.  Georgians believed that this military base had backed separatists during conflict in 
1992-1993.  Russia, on the other hand, claimed that all military equipment had been removed 
and that base facilities were used by Russian peacekeepers deployed after the Abkhaz 
conflict.  The timeframe for closing Akhalkalaki and Batumi was left open and remained 
undetermined.  Negotiations were hindered by Russia in an attempt to prolong the presence 
of the bases.  These two bases presented a strategic interest for Russia: the Akhalkalaki base 
was positioned on the Turkish border on the route from Turkey to the South Caucasus, and 
the Batumi base was located on the Black Sea coast.  Finally, the last two bases were 
officially removed in 2007, Akhalkalaki on 27 June and Batumi on 13 November.68  After 
the war between Russia and Georgia, the Kremlin restored and strengthened its military bases 
in Abkahzia and South Ossetia.  The Messenger staff argues that the main motive for 
Russia’s intervention into Georgia was to restoring its military presence in the South 
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Caucasus, because it would secure Russia’s military presence in the region and thereby 
control and undermine European attempts to build alternative energy pipelines.  As a source 
states, Russia will “… use military muscle to defend […] economic interests.”69 
 
Economic interests 
During Soviet times Georgia was one of the wealthiest republics.  However, due to 
high integration of the Georgian economy with that of other Soviet states, Georgia remained 
dependent on Russia after its independence.  Due to increasingly tense relations with 
Georgia, Moscow exerted economic and political pressure by closing borders, suspending air 
and ground transportation, and imposing embargos on Georgian exports and agricultural 
products.  Since economic sanctions and other punishing measures did not make Georgia 
rethink its western orientation, Russia intensified its support to breakaway regions, which 
seemed to be the only way to press Georgia and influence its desire joins NATO.   
Moscow has its own economic interest in Georgia, especially in Abkhazia, which has 
agricultural land, the port of Sukhumi, a railway link, and a resort area.  Russia’s vital 
interest is Georgia’s geographic location; it serves as a bridge between the Caspian and Black 
Seas.  This location allows for monopolization and securing of additional routes to transport 
oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to Europe and beyond.  Russia’s actions 
demonstrate that energy has become a “weapon” for the promotion and advancement of its 
own geopolitical and economic interests.  Russia’s near monopoly of Central Asian energy 
exports, plus instability in the Middle East, have advanced Russia’s position as a center for 
the promotion of geopolitics through energy.   
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“Protection” of the Russian Diaspora 
Protection of the Russian diaspora in Georgia, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia 
corresponds with Russia’s foreign policy’s fourth principle, the “protection of life and 
dignity of Russian citizens.”  After the war with Georgia, President Medvedev stressed that 
Russia will protect Russian citizens ‘wherever they are.’  However, it seems that Russia is 
concerned not so much with protecting the lives of Russian citizens, as with the mere 
justification or excuse for Russia’s involvement in the area and strengthening its presence in 
the ‘near abroad’.   
Today, the exact demographic breakdown of the population in South Ossetia is 
unknown.  As of the 1989 census, Georgia had a population of 5.4 million, among them 70 
percent Georgian, 8 percent Armenian, 6.5 percent ethnic Russian, 1.8 percent Azeri, 3 
percent Ossetian, and 1.8 percent Abkhaz.  South Ossetia in 1989 had about 100,000 people, 
of whom 66.2 percent were Ossetian, 29 percent were Georgian, and 2.1 were ethnic 
Russian.70   
Support of Russian Diasporas in CIS countries is reflected in Russian foreign policy 
and Moscow has come up with the idea of “compatriots,” which is a vague category that 
includes former Soviet citizens living in newly independent states.71  This category has 
become a method for Russian politicians to manipulate and validate their policies in 
separatist regions inside former Soviet republics.  The ‘passportization’ process started in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia several years ago as well.  The majority of the population in 
those breakaway regions was granted “citizenship of the Russian Federation.”  The argument 
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of protection of Russian citizens was used by Moscow as a justification for the military 
intervention into Georgian territory in 2008.  In fact, the Kremlin’s readiness to protect its 
citizens in every corner of the former Soviet Union generates fear because even a small 
concentration of Russian citizens might be considered a threat for any former Soviet republic.  
 
Russia’s Participation in Multilateral Organizations 
The Russian leadership, as well as that of any other state, sees multilateral institutions 
as instruments for promoting its national interests.  Multipolarity is mainly understood as 
competing interests between great powers in which each power pursues its own national 
interests without taking into account the interests of other countries.  According to Ambrosio, 
Russia pursues the idea of multipolarity with intention to create “… conditions in which 
Russia can effectively resist American military, geopolitical, and economic encroachment.”72   
 
Membership in the United Nations 
The Russian Federation has been a United Nations member state and a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council since its establishment.73   Russia allocates a 
special place for the United Nations system and considers it the only mechanism able to 
shape a multipolar world.  Still, Russia’s belief in the UNSC as the only legitimate institution 
authorizing the use of force contradicts Moscow’s actual way of conducting foreign policy 
and recognition of international law.  For instance, Moscow does not see a need for UNSC 
authorization for peacekeeping operations on the territory of former Soviet republics.  Such a 
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view closely connects with Moscow’s belief that the near abroad is a special “zone of 
Russian responsibility” and thereby ‘peacekeeping’ operations should be done mainly by 
Russia.  In addition, Russia’s incursion into the territory of a sovereign state in August 2008 
leaves doubt about its real commitment to multilateralism and its proclamation of creating 
multipolar world where interests of all parties are taken equally. 
A permanent seat on the UNSC gives powerful states a certain privileged position due 
to veto power.  In this regard, having a permanent seat on the UNSC is considered by Russia 
as significant for the promotion its national interests.  Firstly, building a multipolar world is 
one of the main principles in Russian foreign policy and the UNSC is viewed by Moscow as 
an arena for influencing global processes and opposing the dominant power (i.e. the US).  
Secondly, veto power on the UNSC plays an important role in protecting Russia’s interests 
and provides conditions where Russia treated as a great power by other major powers.   
 
Membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Like the United States, Russia has seat at the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), which is the largest regional security organization in the world.  
The OSCE played one of the central roles in facilitating the transitions of the former Soviet 
republics, as well as in deploying the peace mediation missions to mitigate conflicts that 
occurred in Georgia, Moldova, and the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, disputed between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.   
 Nevertheless, within the OSCE there are differences among participating states, 
namely between Russia and the West.  At one time Russia, due to the threat of NATO 
expansion, was forcefully advocating making the OSCE (then CSCE) a central European 
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security institution and hoping to introduce a ‘security council’ with veto power in order to 
make decisions on behalf of the member states (as per UN style).74  However, the battle for 
the primary role in European security was won by the US, keeping NATO as the dominant 
institution in the European security arena and the OSCE as a supporting organization.75   
In this regard, Russia accuses the OSCE of bias and lacking in balance in judging 
events in the east and west.  In turn, western delegations complain that Russia hinders the 
OSCE’s ability to resolve a number of long-standing problems in the post-Soviet space.76  At 
the Munich security conference on February 10, 2007, Putin sharply criticized the work of 
the OSCE and stressed that this institution had become an instrument for the promotion the 
foreign policy interests of one country or group of countries (western countries).  He also 
accused the OSCE of interference in Russia’s internal affairs through non-governmental 
organizations, and thereby undermining stability.77  
Despite all of these accusations the OSCE plays a considerable role in Russian 
foreign affairs.  Moscow considers the OSCE a tool for moving its foreign policy interests 
when needed.   First of all, through the OSCE, Russia has an opportunity to act and influence 
the formulation of the European and Eurasian security agenda.  Secondly, Russia has 
influence and control over OSCE field missions; for instance, Moscow, along with other 
member states, appoints heads of missions by consensus.   
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Membership in the regional institution of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
The Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) is an institution in which Russia 
enjoys an unquestionable leadership position and exercises its influence unchecked, for all 
intents and purposes.  Moreover, the CIS corresponds with Moscow’s understanding of 
multilateralism.  The CIS was created on 8 December 1991 by three core Slavic states.  
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed a ‘Creation Agreement’ that marked a formal civilized 
divorce from the USSR.  At the same time the agreement was open for other former Soviet 
republics to join the alliance.  On 21 December 1991 in Almaty, leaders of eight other former 
Soviet republics (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) joined the CIS.  Georgia joined the CIS later in 1993, albeit 
reluctantly due to the stationing of Russian peacekeeping forces on Georgian territory.  The 
CIS declaration bound all members to cooperate on an equal basis in foreign, military, and 
economic policy.  As a regional organization, the CIS participates in UN peacekeeping 
forces.78  Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and four Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) 
founded, within the CIS framework, the Eurasian Economic Community, with the objective 
of creating an integrated common economic market, border security standards, customs 
union, standardized currency exchange, and joint programs on social and economic 
development.  Throughout the 1990s, CIS member states were busy discussing the shape of 
the organization but were divided about what directions the CIS should take.   
In May 1992 in Tashkent, the Treaty on Collective Security was signed by six CIS 
member states (Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan), and 
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in 1993 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus joined the organization.  However, in 1999, 
Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan withdrew from the Treaty on Collective Security by 
refusing to sign the protocol renewing the treaty for another five year period.  On 18 
September 2003, in accordance with the decision of the heads of the member states, the 
Treaty was transformed into an international organization and renamed the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  This transformation was initiated by Russia in order 
to demonstrate to the outside world that Moscow is the leader of a politico-military bloc in 
Eurasia and continues to play the dominant role in post-Soviet space.  Officially, the main 
purpose of the organization was declared to be the coordination and deepening of military 
and political cooperation, the development of multilateral structures and mechanisms of 
cooperation for ensuring national security of the member-states on a collective basis, and 
providing assistance, including military, to member-states who fall victim to aggression.79 
The last CSTO summit, which was held in Moscow on 4 February 2009 with the 
participation of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, adopted the decision to develop the Collective Rapid Response Forces to 
respond to broader threats and challenges. 80  In this regard all seven member states signed a 
document on providing one battalion for the formation of the force.81  During the summit the 
CSTO’s mission was defined as “… deterring and repelling aggression by conventional 
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military forces; defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the organization's 
member countries; conducting "special operations"; and dealing with asymmetrical threats 
and challenges, including international terrorism, radical Islam, and other forms of "violent 
extremism," trans-border organized crime and drug trafficking, and even natural or 
technological disasters.”82  Vladimir Socor doubts that the explicit mission is in accordance 
with the real capabilities of CSTO member states.  Thus, he states that “those forces consist 
of 10 battalions in Central Asia-five Russian battalions stationed in Tajikistan and another 
five battalions contributed in theory by Central Asian countries but based in practice 
permanently at home. Designated as "rapid-deployment forces," they seldom exercise 
together and their on-call, rapid-deployment capability is dubious.”83 
The issue of collective peacekeeping was also among the missions of CSTO.  
Interestingly, “peacekeeping” operations of the CSTO might be conducted without an 
international mandate; however, the possibility to participate in internationally mandated 
peacekeeping actions outside of the CSTO were mentioned during the summit too.84  Such 
differentiation is a clear example of the Russian claim for CSTO as its “zone of influence,” 
where it can conduct “peace operations” without any international authorization.   
Russian policy toward the CIS has not been consistent throughout the institution’s 
history.  The increased focus of Russia’s CIS policy derives mainly from the political and 
socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, relations with the West, and 
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developments inside the newly independent states.  In fact, Russian foreign policy right after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was directed toward integration with the West.  This policy 
was the result of a willingness to integrate with European states, but also due to deep 
economic and social stress and the need for external financial support.  Thus, closer 
cooperation with the West significantly eliminated Russian interest to reintegrate with the 
near abroad and develop the CIS institution.  Notably, the Central Asian states in the early 
1990s were considered a burden.  Conversely, with the deterioration of Russian-Western 
relations during the Kosovo crisis and with NATO expansion, the discourse of common 
historical unity has turned out to be central in relations with the CIS.85  According to Smith, 
Russian rhetoric of reintegration with the CIS was mainly a tactical device: with threat of 
NATO expansion toward Central Europe, Russia rushed to strengthen collective security ties 
within the CIS as a counter measure.86  The decisions taken during the last CSTO summit in 
Moscow in February 2009 serve as evidence of Russia’s decisiveness to strengthen ties 
between CIS countries due to deteriorated relations with the West.87 
In the Putin era, the integration of the CIS was more tangible than it was during 
Yeltsin’s reign.  The series of ‘colored revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was 
seen as a potential weakness of Russian influence in these countries.  During Putin’s reign 
and with election of Dmitri Medvedev as a President of the Russian Federation, there was 
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and still is open political and diplomatic intervention into western CIS states.  This can be 
seen in the Kremlin’s political support to pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine, the maintenance 
of separatist movements in breakaway regions of Georgia and Moldova, etc. 
In sum, the strength of the CIS as an international organization is questionable due to 
vagueness of its organizational structure and capabilities.  However, Russia’s eagerness to 
strengthen the CSTO is important in the implementation of its policies in the ‘near abroad.’  
Also, the existence of the CSTO as a military block (prototype of NATO) in the post-Soviet 
space will serve as an instrument for the promotion of Russia’s geopolitical interests and 
legitimize its military activities in conflict zones.  Russia, by heading the CSTO, takes its role 
of security guarantor into conflict-affected areas by imposing agreements where it can use 
“peacekeeping forces” without international authorization.  The proposal to conduct peace 
operations without international authorization could lead to serious destabilization in Eurasia 
and gives quite a lot of room for Russia to maneuver and pursue its self-interested policies by 
ignoring the interests of other CIS countries.  The fact of military intervention into the 
territory of one of the CIS member states is a clear indication that Russia can no longer 
pretend to be a guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet space.   
In summary, having looked at the national interests of the US and Russia, the analysis 
has revealed that both countries were motivated in their engagement in respective regions by 
the objective of protecting their geostrategic and economic interests.  The US, with its great 
military and economic capabilities, is inclined to examine its engagement from a vital and 
strategic interest point of view prior to responding to distant violent conflicts.  In terms of 
engagement of a multilateral framework, the US prefers to engage the NATO alliance rather 
than the UNSC or OSCE due to NATO’s flexibility and ability to rapidly respond to 
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challenges.  In the Balkans, the US’s vital interest was to demonstrate NATO’s credibility 
and therefore maintain its leadership position in Euro-Atlantic relations.  The Southern 
Caucasus represents more strategic interests in terms of an alternate energy sources and a 
counterbalance to Russian regional power domination.   
For Russia, Georgia, rather than the Balkans, represents a vital geostrategic interest.  
The region is of geostrategic importance in terms of keeping its energy monopoly, 
dominating, influencing and controlling the region, and preventing NATO (and therefore US 
influence) from expanding in the post-Soviet space.  The Kosovo crisis was of less 
importance to Russia’s national interests.  The Kremlin’s interest was mainly about the 
inclusion of Russia in European security affairs and therefore recognition its great power 
status.  Moscow considers the UN to be the only legal institution empowered to deal with 
conflicts, although in reality Russian action contradicts its rhetoric.  The Kremlin is very 
comfortable in the CIS since it gives Russia room to maneuver and pursue its own 
geopolitical and strategic interests in the post-Soviet space.  The incursion into the territory 
of sovereign Georgia sets a dangerous precedent for possible future Russian actions in the 
post-Soviet space.  
 The next chapter discusses the US’s motives for military intervention into the former 
Yugoslavia.  It briefly touches on the history of conflict and describes the process of 
diplomatic efforts made before military intervention into the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
“OPERATION ALLIED FORCE”: DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND MILITARY 
INTERVENTION INTO KOSOVO IN 1999 
 On March 24, 1999 NATO, led by the United States, conducted airstrikes against 
Serbia under “Operation Allied Force” with the official aim of protecting Kosovo Albanians.  
As Daadler and O’Hanlon point out, it was not initially planned as a real military action; 
rather, it was more about threatening measures to convince Slobodan Milošević, the 
Yugoslav President, to accept the Rambouilet agreement to achieve the political settlement of 
the Kosovo province.88  The authors cite the statement made by President Bill Clinton on the 
day the NATO bombing began, which points out that the Alliance had three goals: (1) to 
demonstrate to the Serbian leadership the seriousness of NATO’s purpose, (2) to deter 
violence against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and (3) to damage the Serbs’ military 
capacities.89  In this chapter I will discuss the United States’ motives for engagement in the 
Kosovo crisis and its commitment to get the allies on board to go along with the use of force.  
 
US motives for military intervention into the former Yugoslavia 
There were two main motives that drove the United States during the Kosovo crisis.  
The first motive concerns the threat to stability in Europe due to intensification of war 
atrocities in Kosovo, which resulted in refugee flows.  The US, along with its European 
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allies, considered large refugee flows into neighboring countries a potential source of 
instability and thus a threat to peace and security in Europe.  According to the UNHCR, after 
the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989, about 350,000 ethnic Albanians left 
Kosovo and sought asylum in Western Europe.90  With the beginning of the conflict in 1998 
another 100,000 people fled their homes to neighboring countries such as Albania, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia.91  Considering that recipient countries were already in deep 
economic and political crises, the US and its NATO allies were concerned that refugee flows 
could greatly destabilize the whole European region and lead to a “second Bosnia.”  As a 
result of the Bosnian war about 340,000 Bosnians fled to Germany.  After signing the Dayton 
agreement in 1995, some 60,000 returned home and an additional 30,000 Bosnians returned 
in the first half of 1997.  Since Bosnia has been unable to house the approximately 750,000 
refugees forced from their homes by ethnic conflict, Bosnia told the German government that 
it could not accommodate more returnees from Germany.92   
The second motive is the issue of NATO’s credibility and determination of its new 
role, which was a central question in American politics in the 1990s. It was of strategic 
interest to ensure NATO’s new mission in Euro-Atlantic political relations and preserve 
NATO as an instrument for power projection and maintaining a leadership position in 
Europe.  Continued leadership is vital for the promotion of American economic and political 
interests in Europe and elsewhere.  Therefore, Kosovo per se was not a US interest; it was 
more a vehicle through which to demonstrate NATO’s credibility and preserve it as an 
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instrument for maintaining the US’s leadership position.  In addition, Kosovo was a chance 
to demonstrate once again to Western European countries that without the US’s technological 
capabilities and resources the protection of security on the continent would be challenging.  
For the US it was very important to act decisively; anything else could have provoked 
discussion and undermined the future role of NATO in Europe.  If NATO’s role were 
weakened, Washington risked losing a tool for the projection of its own national interests and 
leadership in Europe. 
There were discussions among the European countries about the creation of an 
alternative security mechanism to NATO, which could weaken the US leadership role.  
Smith points out that in the course of NATO’s internal adaptation process there had “… been 
the discussions and studies focusing on the possibility of creating mechanisms whereby 
European members of the alliance might undertake military operations without the frontline 
participation of US forces.”93  This principal resulted in the establishment of the Combined 
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) during the Brussels summit in 1994.  The idea was the deployment 
of flexible forces by a ‘coalition of the willing’ within NATO framework for reasons other 
than responding to a direct attack on a member state.94  Not all NATO members could 
participate in such an operation even though there was the assumption that all members 
would participate in defining the strategic and political goals of the CJTF.  
The Kosovo crisis represented in some ways a turning point for the Europeans in 
defense policy and confirmed that the European Union’s role in international crisis 
management is ineffective.  Taking into account the failure of EU countries to efficiently 
respond to the war in Bosnia, the Kosovo conflict underlined once again their collective 
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inability to deal with a European security problem without substantial support from 
Washington.  Increased hostilities in Kosovo sidelined the EU and demonstrated the limits of 
diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions.  The conflict therefore made clear to the 
Europeans that there was a gap between diplomatic and security aspirations and the capacity 
to act and make decisions independently.  The US’s technological capability and key 
elements of effective conduct of war such as command, control, communication, and 
intelligence capacity were lacking in the EU.95  Besides European dependence on the US’s 
technological and resource capacity, the war in Kosovo was dictated by the American ‘zero 
casualty’ doctrine, i.e. not sending ground troops, thus reducing the risk to American 
soldiers.  In addition, for EU members it was apparent that EU and US security interests were 
not always convergent.  The fact that the Clinton administration faced difficulties at home in 
getting public support throughout the operation indicates that Kosovo was not considered a 
vital US interest.96  Western allies realized that the US’s strategic interest was NATO 
credibility, not Kosovo.   
Considering all these factors, the EU generated political discussion about the creation 
of a genuine European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which would give them the 
capacity for independent actions backed by European military force.97  This idea was 
initiated at the end of 1998 by the Franco-British leadership and for the first time all EU 
members took this idea seriously and agreed on the necessary capabilities in order to 
effectively tackle an international crisis.  Still, after a series of summits, EU members agreed 
                                                          
95
 Weymouth, Anthony and Henig, Stanley.  The Kosovo Crisis: The last American War in Europe? Reuters: 
Pearson Education: London, 2001. 
96Ibid.  
97
 Ibid. 
 55
that collective defense would remain NATO’s responsibility.98  The EU, adhering to the 
principles of tolerance and compromise, emphasized the creation of an autonomous military 
structure based on the inability to effectively conduct crisis prevention and management.  
Such political debates inside the EU created conditions for the possible limiting of the US’s 
leadership role in European security policy, which in turn motivated America to take a 
decisive role in managing the Kosovo crisis.  
 
History of conflict  
Hostility and resentment intensified with the March 1989 abolishment of Kosovo’s 
autonomous status from the 1974 Yugoslav constitution.  The Yugoslav government, under 
the direct command of Milošević, stopped providing social, economical, and political goods 
to the province and the use of the Albanian language was restricted.  Aggressive national 
policies against Kosovo Albanians led to social, economic, and political inequalities, which 
resulted in the creation of separatist army, cited as the main root causes of the conflict.  
Structural violence, including institutionalized poverty, widened divisions and hostility 
between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.  In the beginning of the 1990s Kosovo Albanians 
experienced constant repression from the Yugoslav government that led to some international 
protest.  However, the international community was engaged in solving violent conflicts in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and did not pay much attention.   
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In May 1992, Ibrahim Rugova was unofficially elected as Kosovo’s first President. 99  
He insisted that Albanians undertake only peaceful resistance for equal rights, hoping that the 
international community would intervene and support the Kosovo Albanian population.  
Under Rugova’s leadership, a parallel government was created in Kosovo as a response to 
the neglectful and discriminative policy of the Serbian leadership.  However, until the 
signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995, the international community had undertaken few 
initiatives to prevent the outbreak of violence.  One of these initiatives was authorization by 
the United Nations Security Council of the Preventive Diplomacy Operation (UNPREDEP) 
on the border between Serbia and Kosovo in March 1993.100  It is important to mention that 
Milošević was viewed as a ‘peacemaker’ in Bosnia Herzegovina, and the US, as well as 
European Union, did not want any confrontations with the Serbian leader in order to ensure 
the smooth implementation of the Dayton agreement.  The international community, up until 
March 1998, considered the province as a separate case in the Yugoslav crisis, since Kosovo, 
unlike Bosnia, Croatia, or Slovenia, never had Yugoslav republic status, and therefore it was 
considered Serbia’s internal matter.   
Due to Kosovo’s ‘special status’ and the inability of the international community, and 
the European Union in particular, to act proactively and stop human rights violations in 
Kosovo, peaceful turned to violent resistance by the rise of the less compromise-minded 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).  The KLA’s military activities reshaped the political 
situation, radicalized Kosovo Albanian politics, and attracted the attention of the 
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international community due to the intensification of war atrocities and ethnic cleansing that 
generated refugee flows.  The international community accepted the fact that the government 
may use force against terrorists to keep order and security.  But the Yugoslav government’s 
response was extreme, resulting in notorious humanitarian abuses, especially in areas where 
the KLA was active.  Thus, between the end of February and the beginning of March 1998, 
Serbian security forces murdered eighty five people, including women, children, and leaders 
of KLA.101  The massacre in the village of Donji Prekaz on 5 March 1998 was a turning point 
for the close engagement of the international community on the Kosovo conflict, and 
particularly for US policy towards Yugoslavia.  Secretary of State Albright recognized that 
the situation in Kosovo was grave and initiated meetings with the Contact Group with aim of 
pushing the European allies to action in order to prevent a tragedy like the one in Bosnia.  As 
a result, the Contact Group, consisting of France, Italy, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the 
US, issued a statement on March 9, 1998 condemning the brutal actions of the Serbian 
leadership and demanding a set of actions from the Serbian side to be undertaken.  Among 
these demands were initiating dialogue with the Kosovo leadership, withdrawing Serbian 
security forces from Kosovo, and allowing humanitarian organizations and OSCE and 
Contact Groups diplomats to monitor implementations of these demands.102  The members of 
the Contact Group issued a statement recognizing the Kosovo crisis as an international 
problem.   
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Peace-mediation process and use of force 
Before military intervention into the former Yugoslavia, the US and NATO member 
states undertook a lengthy, multistage mediation and negotiation process with the wide 
involvement of multilateral international institutions, such as the UN, the Contact Group, EU 
and the OSCE.  Bellamy divides international engagement during the Kosovo crisis into 
seven periods.  More precisely, Bellamy breaks the period before NATO intervention into 
four periods, namely “debating intervention (March 1998 – October 1998), unarmed 
intervention (October 1998 – January 1999), coercive diplomacy (January 1999 – March 
1999), and limited war (March 1999 – June 1999).”103 
The “debating intervention” period was crucial to what happened in 1999.  
Throughout 1998 the international community undertook almost a year of peace initiatives.  
At first, the US, NATO and European countries’ policy was marked by a focus mainly on the 
imposition of economic sanctions and calling the warring parties to a dialogue for a peaceful 
decision on the political future of Kosovo.  The US took a leading role in conducting the 
negotiations.   
Despite the European community’s recognition that the actions of Serbian forces 
were cruel, NATO countries were divided on the issue of using military force in the former 
Yugoslavia.  On one side were the reluctant countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Greece, 
and they were concerned with two main issues.  The first issue was related to the legitimacy 
of using force and the second one was related to the efficiency of military intervention.  In 
particular, Italy was concerned with a possible flood of Kosovo Albanian refugees; Greece 
has religious ties to Serbia and the majority of the population in Greece was against an armed 
intervention; Spain, with its Basque separatists, was wary of NATOs supporting a 
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secessionist movement; France and Germany were mainly concerned about the legitimacy of 
a military intervention.  The other group, which included the US and the UK, was more 
inclined to use military force, although they considered it a last resort.  Both countries feared 
that violence in Kosovo might spread within the Balkans and undermine implementation of 
the Dayton Agreement.     
Even UN Security Council Resolution 1160, adopted on 31 March 1998, on the 
imposition of an arms embargo and a call for an end to the violence in Kosovo, did not 
identify the violence in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security as per Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.  Moreover, the resolution legitimized Serbia’s two main claims: the 
first considering Kosovo to be a part of Serbia, and the second being the recognition of the 
KLA as a terrorist organization.104  However, the following UNSCR 1199 (23 September 
1998) affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to 
international peace and security emanating from the Serb side.  In addition, UNSCR 1199 
demanded that all parties cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire, that the Serbs withdraw 
their forces from Kosovo, and that the issue of the political settlement of Kosovo be solved 
only by peaceful means.  The Security Council demanded that the Serbian and Kosovo 
Albanian leaderships take steps in order to improve the humanitarian situation.  The UNHCR 
estimates that about 230,000 people were displaced and among them 50,000 people were 
without shelter and access to basic necessities.105   
Russia’s position, as well as that of China, was quite opposite the position of the US, 
the UK, and other pro-force NATO countries.  As permanent members of the UN Security 
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Council, Russia and China clearly stated that they would veto any UN Security Council 
Resolutions authorizing the use of force against sovereign FRY.  Russia was of the deep 
conviction that the Kosovo conflict was Yugoslavia’s internal matter and therefore should be 
solved by the Yugoslav government.   
Russia supported UNSCR 1199 only on the condition that the resolution would not 
authorize the use of force against Yugoslavia.  This opposition by Russia was based on regret 
over the loss of its great power status and the anti-western disposition of the Russian political 
elite.  In their inability or unwillingness to solve domestic economic and political crises, 
together with their dependence on international funds, led the Russian elite to blame (as the 
former ‘cold war’ enemy) the West for Russian problems (enormous external debt, 
unsuccessful economic reforms, and declining Russian status in international arena).106  Yuri 
Davydov points out that US involvement in the Kosovo crisis was perceived by Russia as 
eagerness to exclude Russia from a region in which Russia had influence.  In this regard, 
Davydov states that the Kremlin’s approaches during the Kosovo crisis were oriented not to 
solving Kosovo’s problems, but to counter the decisions of the American model.107  
Domestic political forces highly criticized Yeltsin’s policy and inability to stand up for 
Russia’s interests in the Balkans and support “pan-Slavic unity” in the face of an ‘aggressive 
West’, in particular the US.  The firm position of Russia and China convinced some Western 
countries in doubt to take rapid and aggressive actions.  Thus, some NATO countries 
justified their agreement to use force by considering the desperate humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo and the inability of the UN Security Council to step in and decisively solve the crisis.    
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The unarmed intervention began with sending Richard Holbrook, chief Balkan 
diplomat, as a special US envoy to negotiate with Belgrade in early October 1998.  Holbrook 
had two main goals for this mission.  The first goal was to demonstrate commitment to the 
searching for peace in order to ensure domestic political support in NATO countries.  The 
second goal was to present six demands requiring implementation by Serbian leadership, 
namely Milošević, in order to meet the UN’s request.  The list of things to do was repeated 
by Contact Group as well.  Notably, the demands included an end to offensive operations; the 
withdrawal of Serb security forces and heavy weapons and a return to their positions before 
March; free access for humanitarian agencies; cooperation with the International War Crimes 
Tribunal in order to bring to justice those who committed atrocities; the facilitation of return 
of refugees without fear; and the start of negotiations on a proposal drafted by Christopher 
Hill, US Ambassador to Macedonia, after consultations with both warring parties.  One major 
purpose for Holbrook was to put in place a verification system in order to monitor the 
fulfillment of UN demands.108  Another purpose was to discuss the nature of a possible 
dialogue between the warring parties.109  
As a result, Holbrook attained three important agreements.  The first agreement was 
to give free access to the area for humanitarian aid agencies and international organizations 
to assist displaced persons in returning home or finding temporary shelter.  The second was 
Miloševič’s agreement to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians and discuss the future 
political settlement of Kosovo with US assistance.  The third was the FRY President’s 
agreement to dispatch the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) under the 
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protection of the OSCE to monitor and assess the security situation and well-being of the 
people in Kosovo.110  In addition, it was agreed to establish an unarmed NATO air 
verification mission to ensure that Serb military and security forces would be withdrawn to 
the agreed-upon stations.  UNSC Resolution 1203 (24 October 1998) endorsed the decision 
to introduce the NATO air verification mission and the OSCE’s monitoring missions over 
Kosovo.   
However, the Holbrook - Miloševič negotiation also had shortfalls.  It failed to spell 
out the details of the agreement; for instance, it did not specify the number of Serb forces that 
had to be withdrawn from Kosovo.  Furthermore, the verification system did not have the 
capability to enforce Serb compliance, which “… undermined NATO’s ability to threaten or 
use force in case of Serb noncompliance.”111  Finally, the opinion of the Albanian side was 
not considered in the agreement, which resulted in a lack of specific details on the prevention 
of the taking of revenge by Kosovo Albanians on the retreating Serbian army.  Besides all 
these shortfalls, the situation on the ground deteriorated and war atrocities continued.  The 
Serbian government failed to meet the requirements indicated by resolution 1199; in 
particular, the Serbs kept their troop numbers over the required limit in the Kosovo province.  
Meanwhile the Kosovo Liberation Army was taking advantage and seizing territory, 
especially in rural areas.   
In September 1998 NATO allies started discussing the appropriateness of using 
military force in order to persuade Belgrade to fulfill UNSC demands.  The NATO alliance 
discussed two possible options: air force only or a ground option.  The first informal meeting 
                                                          
110
 Bellamy, Alex J. Kosovo and International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 79. 
111
 Daalder, Ivo H. and O’Hanlon Michael E.  Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2000. 50. 
 63
of NATO on the level of defense ministries was conducted on September 23-24, 1998.  At 
that time Secretary-General Javier Solana highlighted the fact that the credibility of NATO 
was at stake after several warnings to the Serbian government about the possibility of the use 
of force.  He stressed that Serbian forces kept their offensive at a low level in order to 
prevent a NATO verdict to use military force.  The Secretary-General cited the joke of 
Serbian diplomats that “a village a day keeps NATO away.”112  His argument convinced 
NATO allies and the decision to issue an “activation warning” (ACTWARN) was approved 
on September 24, 1998.  The activation warning was a sign of recognition by the NATO 
alliance that the situation in Kosovo was increases in importance and urgency.  ACTWARN 
did not mean that the alliance had decided to use force or threaten it explicitly, but it put 
NATO in a position of readiness to act quickly.113   
All negotiation efforts were considered unsuccessful since the Yugoslavian 
government demonstrated a limited admission to provide autonomy to the Kosovo province.  
Moreover, Serbian leaders continued their policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  Such 
persistence resulted in the consolidation and consensus among Western countries to take 
decisive and quick action to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  The Russian government 
positioned itself as the better negotiator by inviting Milošević to Moscow and concluding an 
agreement in June 1998.  According to the agreement Milošević pledged to start talks on a 
whole range of Kosovo problems, stop violence against the civilian population, and give free 
access for humanitarian organizations to assist people.  Still, Yeltsin could not convince 
Milošević to agree on the withdrawal of Serbian police and military forces from Kosovo.  
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Despite signing the agreement to stop violence against civilians, as soon as Milošević arrived 
home he intensified military forces and directed them against villages.  Such actions by 
Milošević resulted in a change in Russian policy and tone regarding Resolution 1199.  
However, despite Milošević’s failure to adhere to the agreement, Russia’s government still 
did not support a NATO use of force due to domestic concerns.  Russia’s unsuccessful 
initiative brought even greater solidarity among western countries to use force to stop human 
rights abuses and to preserve stability in Europe.114  However, western countries needed a 
“trigger” for rapid response.  The killing of a group of Albanians in Račak village in January 
1999 by Serbian paramilitary groups pushed NATO, with Russian agreement, to approve 
coercive diplomacy.  This murder occurred in the middle of the ceasefire agreement brokered 
by US envoy Richard Holbrook in October 1998.   
The members of the Contact Group, NATO, and the UN made coordinated statements 
regarding the situation in Kosovo.  In January 1999 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
visited NATO and in an important meeting he urged NATO to build on the lessons of 
Bosnia.  He affirmed that the difficulties in halting bloody internal conflicts left no illusions 
about the use of force when all other measures had failed, and stressed that that limit was 
being approached in the former Yugoslavia.115  Thus, the speech of the UN Secretary-
General implicitly approved the threat or use of force against a sovereign state.  However, the 
UN Security Council never authorized such actions, as they were sure that Russia would veto 
any use of force against the FRY.  Within hours of Kofi Annan’s statement NATO confirmed 
its readiness to act and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana called Kosovo Albanians and 
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the Serb leadership to agree with the proposal prepared by the Contact Group to establish an 
interim political settlement.116  In turn, the Contact Group called the warring parties to 
negotiate a political settlement and stop violence.   
The negotiation was planned for February 1999 in Rambouillet.  Robin Cook, the 
British Foreign Secretary, presented twenty-six principles to the Serbian and Kosovo parties 
on January 30, 1999.  Upon receiving these principles, the warring parties agreed to 
participate in the conference.  The first week of the Rambouillet conference, under 
chairmanship of the British and French foreign ministers, began on February 6, 1999.  There 
were three negotiators: one from the US, another from the European Union, and third from 
Russia.  The goal of the conference was to proceed on the basis of the draft of an agreement 
for the political settlement of the conflict.  The Serbian delegation was represented by 
relatively low-level delegates, the Kosovo Albanian delegation was fragmented and, 
unexpectedly for the organizers of the conference, the head of the delegation was KLA 
representative Hašim Thaći, rather than Rugova.  The Serbian delegation refused to accept a 
basic political framework for self-governance for Kosovo, and they did not agree to a foreign 
security presence in the region.  Kosovo representatives were divided on the issue of 
demobilization of the KLA, because they worried about provisions on security and demanded 
that the final status of the province be decided by popular referendum.   
During the Rambouillet conference, Holbrook visited Milošević in Belgrade twice, 
trying to convince the Serbian delegation to be more serious and introduce their comments on 
the document.  The first time, his visit was more or less successful because it immediately 
affected the work of the Serbian government; however, the second time Milošević refused to 
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meet.  This conference failed to bring agreement between the Yugoslav government and 
Kosovo Albanians, even though the Kosovo delegation signed an interim accord.  The results 
of the conference led to a consensus in Washington that force would have to be used.  The 
Clinton administration succeeded in convincing its NATO allies that diplomacy without the 
use of force would not work and that the Kosovo crisis would not end.117  
Milošević demonstrated an unwillingness to seriously negotiate and use diplomatic 
means to solve the Kosovo crisis, which led NATO to allege the moral right to intervene.  In 
addition, at the end of March 1999, new rounds of ethnic cleansing were undertaken by 
Serbia, resulting in thousands of ethnic Albanians killed.118  Hereby, despite the warnings of 
the international community to stop the violence and expulsion of the ethnic Albanian 
population from Kosovo, the Yugoslav authorities continued to undertake a repressive policy 
that resulted in the launching of airstrikes.  Thus, on March 24, 1999, NATO, backed by the 
US, launched a military intervention under an Activation Warning that had been issued by 
NATO’s governing body, the North Atlantic Council, on 24 September 1998.119  The main 
goal of the military intervention was to preserve peace and security in the region, which was 
threatened by the Yugoslav government in the province of Kosovo.   
 
Reaction of the Russian Federation  
Russia was plagued by internal dilemmas during the military campaign in Serbia.  
The Russian leadership sharply criticized the action undertaken by NATO members, 
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specifically the US.  The Russian domestic political elite even had a hysterical reaction.  The 
communists and leaders of nationalistic political parties were ready to send in the army to 
support the Serbs due to a sense of pan-Slavic unity.  However, as Davydov argues, Russian 
foreign policy was made for internal use and was mainly oriented towards the interests of 
domestic political elites rather than towards Russian national interests.120  The outbreak of 
anti-NATO and anti-US emotions was a direct advertisement of the political elite rather than 
an expression of real concern over the situation in Kosovo or relations between Russia and 
the West.  Such a readiness to openly confront NATO and the US might be described as a 
populist act that was oriented towards the consolidation of domestic political elites and the 
population of the Russian Federation.  In addition to rhetorical condemnation, Russia 
undertook action in the form of disturbing military maneuvers, such as sending its fleet to the 
Aegean and suspending NATO-Russia links. In addition, Moscow prepared a draft of the 
UNSC resolution requesting an end to NATO military action in the FRY, which was 
supported only by three out of twelve countries.121   
President Yeltsin demonstrated an ambivalent reaction.  On the one hand being pro-
western, he did not want to bring hostility to relations with the West since the financial well-
being of the country depended on western financial institutions.  On the other hand, in order 
to keep power and appease the opposition he condemned NATO’s military intervention into 
Yugoslavia and declared it an illegal action.  Apparently, the Russian leadership by such 
                                                          
120
 Davydov, Yuri. “Problema Kosovo v Rosiiskom vnutripoliticheskom kontekste.” Kosovo: International 
Aspects of the Crisis. Ed. Trenin, Dmitrii I Stepanova, Ekaterina. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1999. 247-279. 
121
 Daalder, Ivo H. and O’Hanlon Michael E.  Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo.  Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2000. 142. 
 68
rhetoric aimed to demonstrate that Russia was still a great power and could protect its 
national interests in the Balkans.   
However, seeming to realize that his opposition was failing and not affecting 
NATO’s actions, Yeltsin decided to change tactics and appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin as a 
special envoy to the Balkans.  In turn, the Clinton administration also sought to bring Russia 
on board to endorse NATO’s core demand and convince Milošević to withdraw Serb forces 
from Kosovo and accept international peacekeeping forces.122 
Chernomyrdin, unlike Primakov, was interested in finding a compromise that would 
end NATO bombing of Serbia and he played one of the key roles in conducting an intense 
seven weeks of diplomacy, which brought about eventual success.  Thus, Chernomyrdin 
played a channeling role in keeping up the dialogue between Serbia and Europe and 
succeeded, together with Finnish President Ahtisaari, in signing an agreement with Milosevis 
in Belgrade on 3 June 1999.  Milošević agreed to withdraw Yugoslav forces from the 
province in exchange for a halt to NATO bombing.  It was agreed that international 
peacekeeping forces (including Russian) would be deployed, with Kosovo remaining part of 
Yugoslavia.123   
 To conclude, the US had two main motives for their engagement in the Kosovo crisis.  
These were closely linked to America’s strategic interest of maintaining a leadership role in 
Europe and the vital interest of ensuring NATO’s credibility and its new role in European 
security.  Examination of the US engagement in the crisis demonstrates wide the involvement 
of multilateral institutions in a lengthy peace-mediation process, even though use of force 
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was not comprehensively authorized by the United Nations Security Council resolution due 
to Russia’s veto.  Despite Moscow’s strong opposition to interference by the international 
community into the internal affairs of the former Yugoslavia, US and NATO leadership did 
not isolate Russia in the peace-mediation process either before using force nor during the 
bombing.  This approach differed from Russian monopolized peace-mediation initiatives in 
Georgia, which led to the unilateral use of force against a sovereign state, which we will 
examine in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
“COERCION OF GEORGIA TO PEACE”: DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND MILITARY 
INTERVENTION BY RUSSIA 
 The international community was stunned by Russia’s military intervention into the 
territory of a sovereign state.  Russia’s disproportionate counter-offensive to Georgia’s 
miscalculated actions resulted in the widespread bombing of military points of strategic 
importance, threatening energy corridors which are significant for European states.  The US 
and European countries harshly accused Moscow of an aggressive attack on the territory of a 
sovereign state, thereby violating international law and threatening the territorial integrity of 
Georgia.  In particular, George Bush, then President of the United States, sharply criticized 
Russia’s attack on Georgia by calling it “bullying and intimidating”124 and stressing that 
Russia’s response was disproportionate.125   
The Russian leadership argued that military intervention was a “defensive” action and 
portrayed it as the “coercion of Georgia to peace,” preventing the threat of aggression, ethnic 
cleansing and “genocide” against Ossetians by Georgia.126  The protection of the citizens of 
Russian Federation and peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia was cited as a main reason for 
taking decisive military actions in Georgia.  Dmitri Medvedev, President of Russia, 
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emphasized that Russia will “… protect the interests of our citizens wherever they may be, 
and this in no way goes against international laws.  This is the duty of any country and any 
leader.”127  The international law argument was used by Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, as justification.  He pointed out that the illegal use of force 
by Georgia and the violation of all existing agreements “… forced Russia to act 
independently, but within international law, including the right to self-defense in accordance 
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”128  Lavrov characterized Russian 
actions as timely, effective and proportionate and highly emphasized that “no one can tell us 
what a proportionate use of force means in this particular situation.” 129 
Despite the humanitarian and international law arguments given by the Russian 
leadership, this study exposes the critical geopolitical motives, intertwined with local, 
regional and global interests, behind them.   
 
Russia’s motives for military intervention in Georgia 
The Russian military intervention into Georgian territory in August 2008 was 
motivated mainly by geostrategic interests.  These interests include maintaining protectorates 
such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, exercising a predominant position in the region by 
having military, political, and economic influence, and sending a message to the West about 
Russia’s growing status as a great power and counterweight to the presence of the US and 
NATO in the post-Soviet space.   
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The preservation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as protectorates was needed for 
securing Russia’s strategic economic and military interests.  The protectorates secure 
Russia’s access to the Black Sea and allow Russia to maintain its naval base on the coast and 
thereby secure the southern frontline from regional powers like Turkey and Iran, as well as 
from the US as global power.  Another benefit of naval base presence in the region is the 
path to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea that provides opportunities for the 
promotion of economic, political, and cultural national interests.  In addition, there is the 
threat that Moscow will lose its naval base in the Crimea by 2017, due to deteriorating 
relations with Ukraine.130  Russia inherited military bases on Georgian and Transcaucasian 
territory.  After defeat in the civil war with Abkhaz separatists (supported by Russian 
military), Georgia raised the issue of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from its 
territory.131  The process of negotiation was long and finally the last two bases of 
Akhalkalaki and Batumi were closed at the end of 2007.132  The fact that Russia did not want 
to withdraw its military resources from the territory of Georgia might serve as one of the 
main reasons for Russia’s willingness to restore its military presence in Georgia.   
Restoration and strengthening of military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is 
strategically important for Russia to secure its presence and thereby exercise its political 
influence by opposing the possible location of US or NATO military forces in the region.  
After the ‘Rose Revolution’ Georgia has conducted a pro-Western, and specifically pro-
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American, policy and has expressed the desire to join NATO and the EU.  In this regard, 
America has been assisting in the training of Georgia’s graduate infantry units within the 
framework of the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP).  In addition, the US supports 
the reformation and restructuring of the Georgian defense system in order to meet Western 
military standards.133  In return, Georgia has become the third largest contributor to 
peacekeeping operations in Iraq under ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ with 2,000 Georgian 
troops.134  It is important to note that in July, amidst growing tensions on both sides of the 
Caucasus Mountains both the United State and Russia were conducting military exercises.  
The two-week military training “Immediate Response 2008,” with 1,000 US and 600 
Georgian forces, was held on the formerly Russian-controlled Vaziani military base.135  On 
the other side of the mountains from July 14 to August 4, Russia conducted the anti-terrorist 
military exercise “Kavkaz 2008” with 8,000 troops.136     
For Russia, presence in the region is also beneficial for keeping economic influence 
by controlling energy transportation, thus undermining European attempts to build an 
alternative energy pipeline.  The geographic location of Georgia serves as bridge between the 
Caspian and Black Seas, which allows the easy transport of oil and gas from Central Asia 
and the Caspian Sea to Europe and beyond.  The destabilization of Georgia and control over 
its territory gives Russia an advantageous position in regards to the West’s access to and use 
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of ports and the energy transportation system that connects the Caspian Sea with the world 
market.  This transit infrastructure has become a geostrategic object for energy resource 
competition and access to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.  For 
Putin’s Russia, the monopolization of energy has become a goal and energy supply a tool for 
promotion of its geopolitical and economic interests in relations with other countries.   
Increasing US presence in the region, NATO’s plans to expand by implementing the 
Membership Action Plan in Ukraine and Georgia, and tensions over planned US anti-missile 
deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic have resulted in the deterioration of Russo-
Euro-Atlantic relations.  Russia considers NATO expansion a direct threat to its national 
security and unity; Putin called the extension of NATO to Russia’s borders a “direct threat to 
the security of our country.”137  Toal points out that Russian leadership made the decision to 
attack Georgia after the Bucharest NATO summit when it became clear that Georgia would 
eventually get NATO membership.138  The Russian leadership might have concluded that 
their position and concerns on this issue were ignored by the West.  Such a perception 
resulted in establishing a formal relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was 
opposed by Georgia.   
 
History of conflict and peacekeeping operation  
The conflict between South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia cannot be described as new 
or hidden.  The actions and behavior of the involved parties, such as Georgia’s discriminative 
policies and provocative rhetoric toward ethnic minorities and Moscow’s interference and 
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support of separatist movements in Georgia’s breakaway regions led to the outbreak of the 
military conflict and resulted in the destabilization of the region.  On an international level 
the five day war became a turning point in relations between Russia, European countries, and 
the United States.   
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first President (1991-1992) of independent Georgia, played 
a brief but vital role in establishing extremely nationalistic, ethnically isolationist policies 
and propagating “Georgia for Georgians.”  Robert English depicts Gamsakhurdia’s reign as a 
main cause of today’s Russian-Georgian military conflict.139  Gamsakhurdia, like Milošević, 
came to power by using chauvinistic rhetoric and manipulative tactics to justify grievances 
and prejudices that resulted in violent conflicts.  English refers to Gamsakhurdia in order “… 
to explain Yugoslavia’s collapse and Kosovo secession from Serbia while ignoring 
nationalist policies of Slobodan Milošević.”140 
The first signs of violent conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia started with the 
beginning of perestroika when the nationalist movements of both sides began to activate.  On 
November 10, 1989 the South Ossetian members of Parliament decided to turn the 
autonomous oblast into an autonomous republic inside of the Georgian SSR.  With that 
decision the South Ossetian leadership appealed to the Supreme Council of Georgia to grant 
them the status of autonomous republic.  However, the Georgian Supreme Council denied 
granting republic status to South Ossetia.  On November 23, 1989 the Georgian nationalist 
movement attempted to conduct a meeting in South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali that resulted 
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in a violent conflict between Ossetian and Georgian armed forces.  The forces of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs of the USSR stopped that conflict. 
A year later in September 1990, South Ossetia declared the establishment of the 
Republic South Ossetia and later in December South Ossetians conducted the first elections 
to the Supreme Council of the Republic.  The Georgian Parliament did not recognize the 
elections and instead decided to cancel South Ossetia’s status as autonomous oblast and 
declared a state of emergency in the region.  That decision deepened polarization even more. 
During 1991-1992, criminally-run militia forces respectively loyal to Tbilisi and 
Tskhinvali were engaged in brutal clashes on the territory of South Ossetia.  The fighting left 
one thousand dead and resulted in thousands of displaced people.141  The fighting was 
stopped with the signing of the Sochi agreement on June 24, 1992 by President of the 
Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (Gamsakhurdia’s successor).  
From the Sochi agreement on, Russia started to conduct peacekeeping operations in the near 
abroad and pledged to be neutral, serving sustainable peace and stability in the region, 
without having experience in a peacekeeping role.  
The Sochi agreement consisted of two elements.  The first was the establishment of a 
Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Russian, Georgian, and North and South 
Ossetian representatives.  The purpose of the JCC “… was to guarantee a cease-fire, 
withdraw armed forces, disband self-defense units, and ensure security regime in the conflict 
zone.”142  In general the JCC was responsible for maintaining peace, returning refugees and 
displaced people, economic rehabilitation, and coming up with a political settlement for the 
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breakaway region.143  The second element of the Sochi agreement was the deployment of the 
tripartite Joint Peacekeeping Force (JKF) with Georgian, Russian, and North Ossetian units, 
operating under command of the JCC.  Protocol following the Sochi agreement defined the 
conflict zone as having a radius of 15 km from the center of the South Ossetian capital 
Tskhinvali.  In addition, a security corridor was established within 7 km on both sides of the 
administrative border of South Ossetia.144  Thereby Russian peacekeeping forces could easily 
establish checkpoints within Georgian territory as well.  That Georgian, Russian, and 
Ossetian national contingents patrolled separately might explain the Georgian perception that 
the Russian forces selectively extended protection to Ossetian civilians, while ignoring 
Ossetian retaliation against the Georgian population in the unrecognized republic.   
After the Russian deployment of peacekeeping forces, Georgia’s government asked 
the OSCE (at the time the CSCE) to send observers to the conflict area.145  On 6 November 
1992, based on the agreement of all parties, the OSCE established its mission with eight 
diplomats and eight officers.146  The OSCE’s objective was mainly to observe 
implementation of the Sochi agreement and undertake conflict resolution actions, including 
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the promotion of nation-building, respect for human rights, and improved relations between 
the parties of the conflict.  Russia has successfully restricted international involvement in the 
South Ossetian as well as in the Abkhazian conflicts which allow to influence and dominate 
in the region and therefore pursue its interests.  The Kremlin ensuring its “special powers and 
responsibilities as a guarantor of peace and stability,” compared with the UN’s rather limited 
observation mandate in Abkhazia and the mandate of the OSCE in South Ossetia.147  
Mackinlay and Sharov point out that Russia at that time had a strong motive to 
manipulate the South Ossetian conflict in order to deploy military units.  These were needed 
for the resurgence of Chechnya and to maintain a strategic frontier on the Armenian-Turkish 
border.148  Therefore, the South Ossetian conflict was a good base for Russia to resolve its 
own problems.  The peacekeeping forces and JCC power were under obvious domination by 
Russian command with limited involvement of international organizations, which is not 
equivalent to United Nations peacekeepers in other conflict zones, for instance in Bosnia or 
Kosovo.  
JCC was not the ideal instrument for solving the South Ossetian conflict.  War 
atrocities were not investigated, giving perpetrators the green light for future war crimes.149  
The Joint Control Commission failed to intensify talks and define the political status of South 
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Ossetia.  As a result, the conflict became “frozen” until 2004, when it was reactivated by the 
Georgian initiative to shut down contraband commerce in the border areas.  The processes of 
returning refugees and displaced people, as well as disarming the local population on both 
sides also failed.  However, Mackinlay and Sharov highlight that in real terms the Russian 
intervention was successful in the way that it “… succeeded in stabilizing the area and 
fostering a gradual return to normality.”150  At the same time the authors question “… the 
sincerity of Russian behavior on the ground,” pointing out that Russia’s involvement in the 
conflict was motivated only by Russia’s geostrategic interest.  Even though the Russian 
Federation provided support for South Ossetians with salaries and pension, infrastructure 
such as gas, heat, and water was tied to Georgia.  
Consequently, since 1992 South Ossetia has been de-facto independent, but de jure 
part of Georgian territory.  In January 1992 a referendum was conducted on the territory of 
the autonomous oblast and as a result 98% of the population voted for independence from 
Georgia.151  Nonetheless, Georgia did not recognize the referendum as legitimate and still 
considered South Ossetia a part of Georgian territory.  In 2001 and 2006 South Ossetia 
conducted unrecognized presidential elections.  The elected leader propagated reunification 
with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation.   
In 2003 Georgia experienced the “Rose Revolution” wherein pro-Western Mikheil 
Saakashvili successfully ousted Eduard Shevardnadze.  The revolution was widely seen as a 
sign of change in the country.  In 2004 Saakashvili was elected as the third President of 
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Georgia.  During his campaign he promised to consolidate the country, build an open 
democratic state, and obtain membership in NATO and the European Union.  The United 
States, European governments, and international development agencies supported the 
eagerness of the Georgian government to implement democratic reforms.  The US provided 
considerable assistance in the modernization of the army in order to meet Western standards 
and obtain NATO membership.  Three oil and gas transportation routes have been built with 
the help of international funds and multiple investors.   One of them is Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline, transporting oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Turkey, 
and ultimately to Europe and the US, was opened in 2006.  In turn, Georgia has actively 
participated in the “war on terror” proclaimed by the US and has provided troops for 
peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Kosovo.  
However, in reality Saakashvili has followed the nationalistic policies established by 
Gamsakhurdia, which resulted in the mishandling of relations with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  His political style might be characterized as impatient, hard-lined and 
uncompromised, with a high desire to achieve goals quickly.  His authoritarianism has led to 
a sharp increase in military spending and has resulted in growing political and civil unrest 
against his rule.  Consequently, major governance problems such as corruption and the 
unequal treatment of ethnic minorities have remained and resulted in deepening polarization 
and recurrence of conflict in the region.  In summer 2004, the Georgian government launched 
an “anti-smuggling” campaign in South Ossetia in the broad framework of country 
strengthening and integration.  The campaign resulted in the eruption of violence and a dozen 
people were killed.152     
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Georgia’s close friendship with the US and Europe, and especially its desire join 
NATO, have irritated Russia, which has resulted in recent years in increasing political and 
economic pressure on Georgia as a form of punishment.  Specifically, these pressures have 
included closing borders and imposing trade embargoes on exports of Georgian wine, 
mineral water, and agricultural products.  With Abkhazia and South Ossetia Moscow has 
undertaken steps toward de facto closer official relations and has lifted previous sanctions 
against the breakaway regions; it has given financial and military “aid” to separatists groups 
and offered Russian citizenship to South Ossetians; there has been a buildup of Russian 
military personnel in the region.  By some estimates approximately 90% of the inhabitants of 
South Ossetia are citizens of the Russian Federation.153  Prior escalation and reactivation of 
the conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, Russian airplanes engaged in a series of 
provocative flights in the airspace of South Ossetia and Georgia.  In July 2008 during the 
visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Tbilisi, four Russian airplanes circled 
over South Ossetia.154   
 
Use of force 
There are different time lines and there is no clarity on what triggered conflict, but it 
is a fact that on the night of 7 August 2008, when world was supposed to gather in peace for 
the start of the Beijing Olympics, Georgian artillery and ground forces attacked South 
Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali in an attempt to “restore constitutional order” and retake the 
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breakaway region.155  Thus a decade of confrontation between South Ossetia and Georgia 
turned into an armed conflict and escalated into open war between Russia and Georgia.  
According UNHCR, 192,000 people have been displaced as a result of the war. Of these, 
127,000 were displaced within Georgia proper, 30,000 were displaced within South Ossetia, 
and 35,000 fled to North Ossetia.156   
Russian response to the military attack was taken unilaterally without any 
consultations with the CIS member states and began immediately with the movement of 
heavily-armed troops that entered South Ossetia and went deep into Georgia, hence into 
Abkhazia.  Apparently, Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, by attacking Tskhinvali, 
aimed to advance Georgia’s own interests, such as using the momentum to take back a 
breakaway region, as well as demonstrating to the West that Georgia’s territorial integrity is 
under threat (in the case of aggressive Russian actions).  Secondly, Saakashvili probably 
expected that a Russian attack would accelerate the process for obtaining NATO 
membership.  At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that 
Georgia would become a member of the Alliance, and launched a period of intensive 
engagement with Georgia to address questions still outstanding pertaining to Georgia’s 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) application.  Future decisions on when Georgia will move 
to the MAP stage and eventually to membership will be based on Georgia’s performance in 
implementing key reforms laid out in the Individual Partnership Action Plan. As agreed at 
the Bucharest Summit, the application to join MAP would be reviewed by Allied foreign 
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ministers in December 2008.157  On 3 December 2008, NATO member states discussed the 
matter and conclude that Georgia, as well as Ukraine, would need to continue the reformation 
process and decided to enhance opportunities for continuing assistance in these efforts.158  
Apparently, their relations with Russia are importance for NATO states (energy dependence), 
which impacted their decision on postponing MAP for Georgia and Ukraine.  But at the same 
time NATO ministers sharply condemned Russian actions and statements made by the 
Russian authorities in justification of its aggressive action against Georgia.  In turn, 
Saakashvili’s decision to attack was also characterized as a huge miscalculation by the 
international community.  The response of the international community was on the level of 
condemnation but without punishment for all responsible parties of the conflict, although EU 
did play a central role in brokering a ceasefire agreement.  
The five day Russo-Georgian war become a turning point in Euro-Russian and US 
relations by threatening the energy corridor that is important for European countries, 
damaging the infrastructure and economy, and recognizing the independence of two 
breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.159  Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
accused the US of staging the Georgian conflict.  He speculated that the conflict in Georgia 
might play a role in US domestic policy in the capacity of support for one of the US 
presidential candidates.160  Apparently such an accusation is connected with the US’s 
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increasing role in the region, including Washington’s efforts to advance NATO membership 
for Georgia and its assistance in the promotion of democratic reforms.   
US plans to deploy an anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
as well as their recognition of Kosovo’s independence, angered the Kremlin and may have 
been a trigger for Russia to undertake a counter-offensive against Georgia.  In fact, at the end 
of August Moscow recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and 
claimed that this was a response to Kosovo’s independence.  President of Russia Dmitri 
Medvedev stressed that “Moscow had to recognize the independence of Georgia's breakaway 
regions because sovereignty cannot be offered to one people and denied to others.”161  The 
Russian leadership blamed Washington for “opening a Pandora’s box” by recognizing the 
former Serbian province of Kosovo in February; Medvedev accused the US of ignoring 
Moscow’s warnings regarding its support for Priština’s move.162  The recognition by 
Moscow of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was sharply criticized by the US and European 
countries.  NATO’s Secretary General rejected the Russian Federation’s decision to extend 
recognition to two breakaway regions and pointed out that such a decision is a direct 
violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions regarding Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, which have been endorsed by Russia itself, and questioned Russia’s commitment to 
peace and security in the Caucasus.163 
 In sum, Georgia’s miscalculated attack on Tskhinvali opened up an opportunity for 
Russia to realize its strategic interests in the South Caucasus and to reestablish the credibility 
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of the Russian army as a fighting force.  It seems that the Kremlin had been waiting for 
months for an opportunity to act and Georgia’s attack provided the perfect excuse.  
Apparently, Moscow had estimated that the US and Europe would not respond significantly, 
because militarily they had no forces in the region ready to respond, economically the 
Europeans are dependent on Russian energy exports, and politically the US needs Russia on 
a number of issues, for example on Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea.  The Russian-
Georgian conflict seems to herald new approaches in world affairs and demonstrates that the 
world is entering the next phase in the process of geopolitical division that are a threat to 
peace and security in Europe.  As the International Crisis Group points out, the conflict 
brought out important issues such as the necessity of reconsideration of European security 
policy, the role and future of NATO, and Russia’s role as a partner in ensuring peace and 
security in Europe and beyond.164 
 In brief, judging by the Russian leadership’s rhetoric, one might think that the main 
motive for Russia’s counter offensive was the protection of Russian and South Ossetian 
citizens.  However, examination of Russia’s motives for military intervention shows that 
Russia has vital geostrategic and economic interests in the Southern Caucasus region.  
Threats to Russia’s strategic interests (e.g. access to the Black Sea) and its national security 
increased with potential NATO expansion right up to the borders of Russia.  In order to 
protect its interests, Russia monopolized the peace-mediation process with limited 
involvement of the UN and OSCE, which led to unilateral decision to use force against 
Georgia.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 An examination of the foreign policy interests of the United States and Russia reveals 
that the promotion of geopolitical and strategic interests, such as securing leadership 
positions and domination in respective regions, has played a decisive role in their 
engagement in regional conflicts.  However, this study reveals that along with similar 
motives and using similar arguments for justification of the US/NATO military intervention 
in Yugoslavia and Russia’s incursion into Georgia, there are distinctive differences in the 
approaches of both countries.  This study has exposed that there is a fundamental difference 
in the level of engagement with multilateral organizations in the peace-mediation and 
negotiation processes, as well in the decision to use force to intervene. 
 
Similarities in goals 
The study exposed three similar elements, which are (1) the absence of 
comprehensive authorization to use force; (2) use of the ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
argument as justification for military intervention; and (3) the promotion of geostrategic and 
geopolitical interests as the real reason for using force in the interventions.  
Both US-led NATO and Russia went to war without a United Nations Security 
Council resolution comprehensively authorizing the use of force.  However, in the case of 
Kosovo, NATO based its action on several UN decisions, essentially UNSC resolution 1199 
of September 1998 and UNSC resolution 1203.  These resolutions were issued due to the 
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large involvement of multilateral organizations such as the UN, the Contact Group, the 
OSCE, the EU and NATO.  The resolutions recognized that the Kosovo crisis presented 
threats to peace and security in the region, imposed restrictions on Serb military actions in 
Kosovo, and called for full and immediate implementation of negotiated agreements.  In 
addition, by UNSC decision, nonmilitary NATO air verification and OSCE’s monitoring 
missions over Kosovo were introduced in Kosovo prior to forceful intervention.  In contrast, 
in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict there was no serious UNSC resolution giving Russia 
the right to use force.   
Even though the respective leaderships of the major powers publicly proclaimed that 
the reasons for both military interventions was the protection of ethnic groups from ethnic 
cleansing, this analysis reveals that involvement in the conflicts was mainly motivated by the 
promotion of strategic and geopolitical interests.  The humanitarian reason for military 
intervention was used for gaining public support and international justification. 
 At first glance it seems that the Balkans is not an arena for American interests, rather 
it is of greater importance to the nations of the European Union.  However, engagement in 
the Kosovo crisis was equally important for the US’s national interests.  The United States 
considers Europe a key region for maintaining the US economy and giving it leverage in 
other important political forums and actions.   The Kosovo crisis underlined once again the 
collective inability and lack of capacity of the European community to deal with security 
problems without substantial US support.  In this regard, Washington’s motive for 
engagement in the Kosovo crisis was a commitment to its European allies and NATO in the 
preservation of stability, peace, and security, which was a main concern for the West; hence, 
Kosovo was about relations between the US and Europe.   
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The strategic interests for the US were to determine a new role for NATO in Euro-
Atlantic political relations and to ensure NATO’s credibility.  NATO is a tool for the US to 
project its power and maintain a leadership position in Europe.  A strong leadership position 
in Europe is vital for the promotion of American economic interests and obtaining 
endorsement from European allies in advancing the US’s political interests in Europe and 
beyond.  As a result, the Kosovo case helped NATO transform itself from a defense body 
into a central peacemaking security institution able to substitute for the UNSC in a crisis 
situation.165   
The engagement of the United States in the Kosovo crisis resulted in the achievement 
of its strategic interests, such as strengthening the partnership with European countries 
(despite some disagreements), securing its leadership position, and ensuring that NATO 
remained an instrument in the promotion of its geopolitical interests.  Recently, Kosovo 
gained independence and, with considerable international assistance, is engaged in the 
process of nation-building, despite some remaining instability on the ground.  As for 
US/NATO and Russian relations, these increasingly deteriorated and represented a source of 
great tension during the Kosovo crisis.  Russia strongly opposed Kosovo’s secession from 
Serbia, claiming respect for Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and considered 
NATO’s military intervention into Yugoslavia illegal.  
 The Russian involvement in the Georgia-South Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia 
conflicts dates back to the beginning of the 1990s.  In the beginning, Russia took a more or 
less neutral role, fearing that the conflicts could have a spill-over effect onto Russia’s 
southern frontiers and thereby undermine stability in the federation.  However, the rise to 
                                                          
165
 I do not discuss the results and consequences of the NATO operation in Kosovo, because it was not the aim 
of my study.   
 89
power of followers of the statist school of thought redefined national interests towards 
securing great power status, counterbalancing the US, and promoting a multipolar world.  In 
addition, Russia identifies Caucasus region as part of a ‘zone of special responsibility and 
influence.’   
 Georgia was always of special interest to Russia, due to its geographic location and 
proximity to Russian borders.  The assertive Russian military intervention into South Ossetia 
and then deep into Georgia was mainly motivated by geostrategic interests.  These interests 
include  obtaining protectorates such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, exercising the 
predominant position in the region by having political and economic influence, and sending a 
message to the West about Russia’s growing status as a great power and as a counterweight 
to the presence of the US and NATO in the post-Soviet space.  Preservation of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as protectorates was needed in order to secure Russia’s strategic economic and 
military interests.  The restoration and strengthening of military bases in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia is strategically important to secure Russia’s presence and thereby exercise its 
political influence by opposing the possible location of US or NATO military forces in the 
region.  Russia’s presence in the region is also beneficial for keeping economic influence by 
controlling energy transportation, thus undermining European attempts to build an alternative 
energy pipeline.   
As a result of the counter-offensive against Georgia, Russia achieved its self-interests, 
such as the restoration and strengthening of its military bases in the Georgian breakaway 
regions, by recognizing the independent status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The 
recognition of Georgia’s breakaway region will challenge other countries in the post-Soviet 
space with separatist problems, for example Transdnistria and Crimea.  The partition of 
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia created the precedent for a new geopolitical 
division of the world’s regions. 
However, international recognition of these achievements is under doubt because the 
international community did not support Russian actions.  What is more, the international 
community was stunned by Russia’s military intervention into the territory of a sovereign 
state.  Russia’s counter-offensive destabilized Georgia, threatened peace and security in 
Europe, endangered energy corridors significant for European states, and demonstrated a 
disregard for international law by intervening in the territory of a sovereign state.  
As this examination has illustrated, both the United States and the Russian Federation 
were driven to pursue national interests.  The chart below breaks down the strategic interests 
of the United States and Russia in Kosovo and Georgia.  
 
Table 5.1: United States’ and Russia’s Strategic Interests 
 United States Russian Federation 
Kosovo • To demonstrate NATO’s 
credibility and transform role of 
NATO in European security 
affairs  
 
• To secure leadership position in 
Europe  
 
 
• To preserve regional stability and 
security in Europe 
• To constrain NATO influence 
in European security affairs 
 
• To preserve great power status 
in Europe 
Georgia • To prevent great power 
domination in the region 
 
• To support Georgia to join 
NATO (NATO enlargement) 
 
• To secure BTC oil pipeline 
• To preserve regional influence 
and security 
 
•  To restore military presence 
and constrain NATO presence  
 
• To control transportation of oil 
and gas  
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Differences in approaches 
There is a distinctive difference in the United States’ and Russia’s level of 
engagement with multilateral international and regional organizations.  The US took a 
leading role in the peace-mediation process in Kosovo. Thus, the mediation and negotiation 
process in Kosovo was multistage and involved a range of regional and international 
institutions such as the UN, the Contact Group, the OSCE, NATO and the EU.  All these 
multilateral international and regional institutions were involved at different stages of the 
conflict and played a role within a specific set of capacities, such as making UN decisions, 
establishing negotiation and working groups, drafting interim settlements, peace mediation 
activities, monitoring missions, resettlement of refugees, and assistance to displaced persons.  
The decision to use force in the Kosovo case was made based on a consensus of NATO 
member states.  In Kosovo after the war, governmental institutions and mechanisms for 
human rights protection to meet international norms were developed.   In addition, Kosovo’s 
independence was declared after a thorough process of international negotiations, and the 
declaration of independence was supported by the international community, notably by 56 
UN member states.166   
Russia considers the post-Soviet space a zone of influence and responsibility; this 
principle is consolidated in the National Security Concept.  Russia also declared itself a 
guarantor of peace and stability in the existing and latent conflicts on its territory and in the 
‘near abroad,’ which are considered the main sources of threats to its stability and security.  
Based on this concept, Russia has played the dominant role in peace mediation and 
peacekeeping operations in the Georgian conflict.  Russia unilaterally deployed its 
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peacekeeping forces into South Ossetia, even though the Georgians and South Ossetians 
were also conducting peace keeping operations in the respective territories.  International 
involvement has been limited to the UN’s rather partial observation mandate in Abkhazia and 
the mandate of the OSCE.  Considering the limited involvement of international and regional 
multilateral institutions, the decision to use force was made unilaterally by the Russian 
Federation and did not involve any immediate negotiation processes.  Russia’s unilateral 
decision to use force as an immediate reaction to Georgia’s attack on its breakaway region 
did not require consensus among its CIS allies.  Russian recognition of South Ossetia’s and 
Abkhazia’s independence right after the war was not supported by the international 
community. 
To conclude, Russia’s approach in the peace-mediation process with the involvement 
of international institutions differs considerably from that of the US.  The chart below recaps 
the differences and similarities in approaches undertaken by the US in its military 
intervention into the FRY and Russia in its incursion into Georgia. 
 
Table 5.2: Differences and similarities in approaches 
 US/NATO intervention into 
former Yugoslavia 
Russian intervention into 
Georgia 
Comprehensive UNSC 
authorization  
Absent Absent 
Argument for justification of 
military intervention  
‘Humanitarian intervention’ ‘Humanitarian intervention’ 
Motives  Promotion of self-interests Promotion of self-interests 
International mediation and 
negotiation process  
 
Year-long process with 
multiple international actors: 
 
Contact Group 
United Nations 
G7/G8 
OSCE 
Negotiation process which 
“froze” conflict: 
 
Russian Federation 
OSCE (limited) 
 
Decision to use force  Multilateral Unilateral 
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Confrontation of interests  
The United States and the Russian Federation were engaged in both conflicts in 
Kosovo and Georgia, even though their positions were opposite to each other.  The parallel 
engagement of Russia and the US in Kosovo and Georgia is explained by the existence of 
Russia’s and the US’s conflicting geopolitical and economic interests in both regions.  Thus, 
during the Kosovo crisis, there was antagonism between the US and Russia, which resulted 
in the deterioration of relations.  The purpose of Russia’s engagement in the Kosovo crisis 
was mainly to preserve its great power status in European affairs and constrain NATO’s 
influence.  To Russia, Kosovo or Serbia in and of themselves did not matter as much as 
Georgia does.  Due to its geographical remoteness, the Kosovo crisis did not present a threat 
to Russia’s vital interests, such as national security.  
The Russo-Georgian conflict marks a new era of geopolitical division, a revival of 
“empire” ambitions, and a reassertion of Russian power.  It is likely that the Georgian case 
represents an open confrontation of interests for geopolitical influence between Russia and 
the United States.  The confrontation was instigated by Russia’s old and new grievances, 
such as a failure to protect its interests in the Balkans; the two stages of NATO’s eastward 
expansion; the desire by Americans to deploy anti-missile defense in Eastern Europe; the US 
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the control of energy routes in the 
Transcaucasian region; the US military presence in Central Asia and its increasing influence 
in the post-Soviet space.  In that context of confrontation, the desire of Georgia and Ukraine 
to join NATO (which was highly supported by the US) and the prospect of deployment of a 
NATO army in its backyard triggered Russian aggressiveness.  Moscow was ready to take 
any steps in order to keep the region under its influence.  Certainly, this is not to say that the 
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discriminative policy of the Georgian leadership toward ethnic minorities did not also create 
preconditions for destabilization in the region.   
Russia considers a destabilized Georgia to be a vital interest, which led Moscow to 
promote its geopolitical interests through control over energy resources and undermining 
European attempts to build alternative energy pipelines.  Russia’s military intervention serves 
as a signal to the US and Europe that Russia is an alternative power, promoting the right to 
create new world order and pursuing its own understanding of liberal democracy.  At the 
same time, Russia sends a strong message to other post-Soviet states, in particular to 
Ukraine, that insistence on joining NATO or on becoming close friends with the West may 
lead to war.  In Georgian case, Russia demonstrated that “we can do it.”   
In sum, the Russo-Georgian war represents a new challenge for the West.  The war 
indicates that there is an ongoing process for a new geopolitical division of the world’s 
regions.  The Russian-Georgian conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical 
world and created a precedent for Russia’s future assertive actions in the post-Soviet space.  
Considering Russian foreign policy interests and its featured tactics in “solving ethnic 
conflicts,” the aggressive action against Georgia is cause for a high degree of concern about 
possible future aggressive actions against Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan.  The outcome 
of the struggle will determine the course of Russia’s relations with its neighbors, as well the 
relationship between the Kremlin and the West, and will critically influence the fate of the 
Caspian basin of energy supplies.   
In this sense, this paper could serve as a model attempting to predict possible Russian 
actions and approaches in the future toward former Soviet republics.  It is likely that Russia 
will use a combination of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ methods for keeping its influence in the post-
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Soviet space.  It seems that for those countries who are still hesitant in choosing the “Western 
camp” or the “Russian camp,” the Kremlin will use ‘soft’ power, such as the granting of 
financial aid, as it did for Kyrgyzstan in exchange for the US airbase.  But for post-Soviet 
countries with rich natural resources and/or good geo-strategic locations that decisively move 
toward the “Western camp,” the Kremlin will use hard tactics and methods, such as those 
used with Georgia.  Ignoring analyses of such ‘coercive actions to bring peace’ in certain 
territories of the former Soviet space could cause serious challenges not only for Europe but 
also for the international community.  It seems that the process of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union is still under way and could have important consequences beyond the post-
Soviet space.   
 
Implications for US and Western policies toward Russia and its ‘zone of influence’ 
In the contemporary world, interethnic conflicts more often become international 
problems rather than remaining internal state issues due to discriminative policies toward 
minorities by the state leadership, as well as to the geostrategic locations that attract 
particular states in the promotion of strategic interests.  The Russo-Georgian war marks a 
new era of geopolitical division, a revival of “empire” ambitions, and a reassertion of 
Russian power.  The case of Georgia displays the tension between the US and Russia and 
demonstrates a clash of interests for geopolitical influence.  Russia’s military intervention in 
Georgia is an extremely bold move to reassert Moscow’s dominance in the post-Soviet space 
and repel US influence in the region.  The NATO enlargement process is a proverbial stake 
in the heart of relations between Russia and the West, in particular the United States.  
Mistrust and misunderstanding shape US-Russia relations.  The Kremlin is suspicious of the 
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NATO enlargement process and considers it a direct threat to Russia.  On the other hand, 
some NATO member states still fear Russia and consider it an aggressive state.   
The evolution of relations between US and Russia will depend on the policies and 
steps undertaken by the new governments of the US and Russia.  Three things might change 
in the prospective future in US-Russia relations.  First of all, with the election of Barak 
Obama as US President, the level of aggression between Washington and Moscow may be 
lessened, despite events in Georgia.  Secondly, however, the economic crisis and a decline in 
oil prices will affect Russia’s behavior, driving it to less assertive actions to the extent that 
Russia is more dependent on the world economy.  Finally, President Medvedev of the 
Russian Federation might also play a positive role in improving relations, if he is able act in 
spite of the “Putin factor.” 
It is very important for the US and western countries to maintain a neutral position on 
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine in order to not provoke future aggression from 
Russia.  Further, in order to ensure the process of democratic reforms and observance of 
human rights in post-Soviet countries, there is a need to establish conditions for receiving 
western financial aid.  Conditions will help to keep state elites accountable and prevent them 
from using financial means for strengthening their power and build quasi-democratic states.  
This is especially important for countries with limited natural resources such as Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  In addition, there is a need for strengthening bilateral relations 
between the US and Russia, which will allow for the creation of dialogue that will result in 
the creation of trust and understanding between the two nations.  That is important lessening 
threat of NATO to Russia.  Finally, it is of vital importance to put in place sustainable 
collaborative and partnership efforts to solve high-priority, global problems such as 
 97
continuing threats by extremist-terrorists and their possible access to weapons of mass 
destruction, climate change, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  There is a strong need 
for cooperation, partnership, and understanding in order to meet and respond to the 
challenges of the XXI century.  The failure to solve these problems could bring catastrophic 
consequences for security, stability, and peace.  It is the responsibility of the world powers to 
understand the key global priorities and put aside the egocentric ambitions of gaining great-
power status, conquering new territories, and/or widening their spheres of influence.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Map of Kosovo167 
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Appendix 2: Map of Georgia168 
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Appendix 3: Map of Caucasian Pipelines169  
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Appendix 4: Map of South Ossetia war170  
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